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ABSTRACT: 
Project costs tend to overrun, regardless of the size and type of the project. Research has shown 
that little progress has been made in this field. The problem also applies to contractors, which 
repeatedly struggle to stay on budget and therefore face cost overruns in their projects. 
 
This study aims to locate the root causes of cost overrun in the projects of the case company, 
which is a global technology company. Moreover, areas for improvement are proposed for the 
mitigation of future cost overruns. To do so, several theories and methodologies are applied: 
The RAL concept, the Analytical Hierarchy Process, the Critical Factor Indexes, the Sense and 
Respond methodology, the Manufacturing Strategy Index, the Sustainable Competitive Ad-
vantage method, and Knowledge and Technology. Two questionnaires were used for the data 
collection and were answered by a total of 18 respondents. Besides, interviews were carried out 
to get background information and to validate the results with the Weak Market Test. This study 
focuses on the engineering process and the site management process of the projects, which 
contribute the most to the cost overruns of the case company. 
 
Challenges in resource management and the cooperation with the client were found to be the 
root causes of cost overrun in the examined projects. To mitigate future cost overruns, it was 
proposed to lay a special focus on Project Scheduling, Basic Design, Detailed Design, and Off-site 
Validation. Moreover, improvements in Resource Management, uniform working directives, and 
special attention to new clients and clients with consultants contribute to the mitigation of fu-
ture cost overruns. The Knowledge and Technology results indicate that the products and ser-
vices of the case company are in the maturity phase of the technology life cycle. Thus, a reduc-
tion in production costs is suggested. The highest uncertainty is related to core technology, 
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Olympic Games generated an average cost overrun of more than 300 percent between 
1968 and 2012, with a median of 150 percent. The Channel Tunnel caused a cost overrun 
of 80 percent, and the Sydney Opera House was 14 times more costly than initially esti-
mated (Segelod, 2018, p. 2). There are numerous famous projects with cost overrun, and 
worryingly, cost overruns don’t seem to be smaller than 100 years ago (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2002). This indicates that no progress has been achieved in mitigating the problem. Pro-
ject costs overrun, independent of the size of the project, or whether it’s a private- or 
public project (Klakegg & Lichtenberg, 2016, p. 177). 
 
Not just project owners but also contractors struggle with cost overruns, even though 
the public rarely hears of this perspective. When a contractor detects cost overrun in a 
project, there are different strategies to cope with it. One possibility is the strategy of 
hope. In this approach, one hopes that the cost overrun is just a random deviation that 
will not repeat itself in the future. This strategy should not be relied on, as even moder-
ate cost overruns could be symptoms of underlying problems. There is the thread that 
these problems will grow more prominent when they are let unnoted. Therefore, signif-
icant cost overruns must always be investigated. It is essential to know why they oc-
curred, how likely they are to repeat themselves, and what corrective measures should 
be undertaken. The people closest to the problem must be consulted to find a solution 
(Luecke, 2004, pp. 131-132). Common causes given by management for poor outcomes 
of projects are bad luck or the unfortunate resolution of one of the major project uncer-
tainties (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, p. 172). However, the root cause for cost overrun usually 
lies somewhere else. The root cause must be located, and corrective measures must be 
launched to get a grip on the problem. 
 
Cost overrun is a versatile topic. The problem must be examined from many angles. It 
can be studied by engineers, accountants, economists, sociologists, psychologists, and 
political scientists (Segelod, 2018, p. 5). This thesis considers research from a variety of 




The case company is a global technology company. According to its website, it plans and 
delivers electricity-, automation-, instrumentation, and supervision systems as turnkey 
projects. Furthermore, the company also offers corresponding supporting services to its 
customers. The projects provide individual solutions for the clients and usually include 
engineering, manufacturing, and installation at the customer’s site. The construction 
sites are around the world (Personal communication, June 25, 2020). 
 
The case company is a contractor. It participates in competitive tenders to get new pro-
jects awarded. Respondent 15 of this study states that the market mostly defines the bid 
price in the tenders. There is not much room for adjustments. However, there are two 
kinds of customers. Some customers tend to choose the contractor who can deliver the 
required specifications within the lowest price. Other customers attach more im-
portance to, e.g., quality and good relationships with the contractor. They are usually 
willing to accept a price premium for these features. However, the bid price must still be 
within reach of the competitors. When contracts are awarded to the case company, the 
vast majority are lump-sum contracts. Most of the customers are private companies, but 
they can also be public authorities. 
 
 
1.2 Research problem and research questions 
Cost overruns keep occurring in projects of the case company. Internal reports show the 
amount of cost overrun per year, month, project, and process within a project (Personal 
communication, 2019). The root causes of the cost overruns are recognized in the cur-
rent process. However, the case company needs to investigate this further to find appro-
priate actions to address them and mitigate cost overrun in future projects. Therefore, 
completed projects in which cost overrun occurred are analyzed. Shortcomings from 
past projects shall not be repeated, and critical processes shall be improved. These ob-




“What are the root causes of cost overrun in projects, and how can this be improved?” 
 
Thus, the objectives of this thesis are: 
 
1. To identify the root causes for cost overrun in the selected projects 
2. To identify areas for improvement to help mitigate cost overrun in the future 
 
 
1.3 Limitations and Definitions 
This chapter specifies the limitations of the research. Moreover, the most important 




Some factors limit the research. Cost overruns are examined from the perspective of the 
case company as a contractor, contrasting with the view of the project owner. The case com-
pany is organized in business units, and there are different segments within a business unit. 
Only projects from one particular segment are considered. When writing about the case 
company, this specific segment is addressed. Three recent projects with cost overrun were 
chosen for this research. They are called Project 1, Project 2, and Project 3. Only the engi-
neering process and the site management process of the selected projects are examined, as 





Project owner – The project owner, who can also be called principal or client, is a buyer 
who hires a contractor to operate a project (Bose et al., 2011, p. 94). 
11 
 
Sales process – According to internal quality documentation, the sales process contains 
all activities conducted by the case company to win a tender. The sales process of a pro-
ject ends when a project can be handed over from sales to project management (Per-
sonal communication, 2020). 
 
Engineering process – According to internal quality documentation, the engineering pro-
cess of a project, in which the case company is involved, includes planning the design, 
the manufacturing, and the off-site validation of the end-product (Personal communica-
tion, 2018). 
 
Site management process – Internal quality documentation states that during the site 
management process, all deliverables are integrated at the customer’s site into a system 
that fulfills the customer requirements (Personal communication, 2018). Respondent 15 
furthermore states that the site manager leads and supervises the work at the site. Often 
there is a sub-contractor for electrification- and automation installations. The site man-
ager is responsible for safety at the site and that the schedule is kept. 
 
Cost estimation – Cost estimation is defined as the case company’s process of forecast-
ing the cost to complete a project within a defined scope. Cost calculation, which is the 
expression used by the case company to estimate the project cost during the sales pro-
cess, is determined to be the same as cost estimation. 
 
Estimated costs – In this thesis, the estimated cost of a project equals the planned cost 
and, therefore, the project budget of the case company. It is used as a baseline to meas-
ure cost overrun. The estimated costs are the same as the budgeted or forecasted cost 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, pp. 175-176). 
 
Cost overrun - The cost overrun, or budget overrun, is the amount by which any actual 
cost exceeded a budget or contract. It is, therefore, the difference between the approved 
budget and the final cost (Segelod, 2018, p. 5). It can also be called variance (Lock, 2013, 
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pp. 57-85). The difference can be measured in either absolute or relative terms. When 
measured in absolute terms, the cost overrun equals the measured cost minus the esti-
mated cost. In relative terms, the cost overrun is calculated either as actual cost in per-
cent of estimated cost or the ratio of actual cost divided by the estimated cost. The cost 
overrun is usually measured as a percentage of estimated cost. A positive value is indi-
cating a cost overrun, and a negative value a cost underrun. Furthermore, the cost 
should be measured in the local currency, with constant prices, and against a congruent 
baseline (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, pp. 175-176, 187). 
 
Cost Increase - Cost increases or cost growth means the increase in cost between two 
estimates. The first estimate doesn’t necessarily need to be an approved budget or a 
figure stated in a contract (Segelod, 2018, p. 5). 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
Chapter 1 provides an understanding of the research topic. The case company, the re-
search problem, and the limitations of the study are presented, and the most important 
terms are defined. 
 
Chapter 2 covers cost overrun in projects by presenting a literature review of the topic. 
The focus is on the contractor’s perspective. This chapter gives a comprehensive insight 
into project cost estimation, offers possible explanations for cost overrun both from a 
technical- and behavioral perspective, and shows ways to mitigate cost overrun. 
 
Chapter 3 thoroughly explains the research methodology. Several theories and models 
are combined to answer the research question, such as operations strategy, the RAL con-
cept, Sense and Respond methodology, the Sustainable Competitive Advantage method, 




Chapter 4 presents the empirical research. First, the research process is illustrated. It 
gives insight into the questionnaire creation, describes the respondents, and some chal-
lenges encountered. In the following data analysis, the questionnaires of every project 
are separately analyzed and compared to each other. Some interviews give more back-
ground to the study. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the results of the empirical research and answers the research ques-
tion. The findings and contributions are presented, the validity and reliability are re-
viewed, and some possibilities for future research are presented. 
 
Chapter 6 comprises of the conclusion, which summarizes the study. 
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2 Cost overruns in projects 
This chapter contains the essential theoretical background related to cost overruns in 
projects. The goal is to establish a deeper understanding of the central factors related to 
the topic, with a focus on the contractor’s perspective. The chapter starts with an over-
view of project cost estimation, which determines the project budget and therefore 
forms the baseline for the measurement of cost overrun. In a second step, an overview 
of the essential explanations for cost overrun is given. Finally, it is presented how cost 
overrun in projects can be mitigated. 
 
 
2.1 Project Cost estimation 
As already mentioned, it is the estimated project cost, which builds the baseline for the 
measurement of cost overrun. Thus, cost overrun can’t be mitigated without an accurate 
forecast of the project cost. A contractor estimates the project cost and derives the bid 




According to internal quality documentation, the case company as a contractor prepares 
tenders during its sales process. The goal of every tender is to compile a solution, which 
addresses the customer’s needs. The offer submitted to the customer should drive to-
wards a positive and early decision in favor of the case company (Personal communica-
tion, 2020). 
 
In competitive tenders, contractors are challenged to make a balanced offer in which the 
cost estimate must be low enough to offer an attractive bid price and, therefore, a good 
chance of winning the contract. At the same time, the offer should be high enough to 
cover possible risks and thereby obviate significant losses (Sonmez et al., 2007). A 
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contingency amount covers potential risks. The contingency is the amount of money that 
must be added to the base estimate according to previous experiences. It is typically 
determined as a percentage of the bare project cost (Kim et al., 2008, p. 398). It is meant 
as a precaution for uncertainties related to project definition and technology. The con-
tingency is money that is expected to be spent but is not intended to cover for scope 
changes or unforeseeable circumstances beyond management’s control, such as extraor-
dinary storms. To be able to set a reasonable contingency, the base estimate of the 
known scope at market conditions must be realistic and competitive. A competitive ap-
proach is to set the contingency in a way that there is a 50% probability of cost overrun. 
In this case, there is a 50% chance that all contingency of a project is spent (Burroughs 
& Juntima, 2004, p. 31). 
 
A contractor must determine the appropriate range of risks for a project, which must be 
covered through the contingency. The determination of risks is not easy, as various risk 
factors must be assessed. International projects usually come with a broader range of 
risks than domestic projects, as contractors are not necessarily familiar with the condi-
tions of the host country. The hazards include possible problems because of language, 
cultural customs, business practices, laws, and regulations. These problems must be suf-
ficiently understood to be able to include a proper amount of contingency to the final 
bid price. The cost estimate must be calculated accurately, flexibly, and comprehensively. 
Moreover, adequate consideration of uncertain factors relating to project cost is re-
quired. Uncertainty can be a result of incomplete information, disagreement between 
information sources, linguistic imprecision, simplification, or approximations. Neverthe-
less, it is impossible to ensure that a project will always be as successful as initially 
planned. Even while implementing a project, there might be unexpected factors that af-
fect cost. These factors can result in either cost overruns or cost savings (Kim et al., 2008, 
pp. 398-399). 
 
If the contractor wins the tender, the contract is awarded. According to Respondent 15, 
the case company usually enters a lump sum contract with the customer, where a single 
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“lump sum” price for all work is agreed before the work begins. This kind of agreement 
bears the risk that the contractor underestimates the project cost and is therefore not 
able to cover the contract expense. The risk is principally transferred from the customer 
to the contractor. The contractor agrees to implement the work for the amount stated 
in the contract, regardless of its actual cost. This agreement is effective as long as there 
is no change or breach of contract from the customer (Smith et al., 2013, pp. 135-136). 
 
 
2.1.2 Cost estimation techniques 
There are different techniques to determine the appropriate amount of contingency in-
cluded in the bid price. Most of the methods take an inside view by focusing on the pro-
ject, considering its objective, resources needed, and obstacles to its completion 
(Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 9). A popular technique is to use an expert’s judgment to assist in 
setting an adequate contingency level. Skilled estimators and project team members de-
termine the level of contingency by using their experience and expertise. However, the 
subjectivity of this approach can be the main disadvantage, as the skill, knowledge, and 
motivation of the experts may vary extensively (Burroughs & Juntima, 2004, p. 32). There 
are different variations of the technique. Klakegg and Lichtenberg (2016) promote the 
Successive Principle, which is based on expert’s judgments in a strictly predefined setting. 
Sources for uncertainty are located, categorized by type, and evaluated successively and 
systematically. A brainstorming with 7-15 experts is organized, which mitigates disad-
vantages as the variabilities in skill, knowledge, and motivation between experts.  
 
Another technique is to add a predetermined percentage. In this case, a contingency of 
either 5 or 10 percent is included in all the projects. The advantage of this approach is 
that it is consistent and straightforward. The disadvantage is the removal of specificity 
and subjectivity (Burroughs & Juntima, 2004, p. 31). 
 
Risk analysis can also be used to find the right contingency level. This technique exam-
ines risk factors in a more structured way than expert judgment and applies specific 
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quantitative methods to translate the assessed risks into contingency. Commonly, the 
Monte Carlo simulation is used as a quantitative method in risk analysis. This technique 
is probabilistic and allows confidence levels to be explicitly considered. A disadvantage 
is that the chosen estimate items are usually not risk drivers in themselves, as there are 
underlying causes for risk. Moreover, more time and resources are required to imple-
ment a risk analysis (Burroughs & Juntima, 2004, p. 32). 
 
Historical performance data shows that using expert judgment outperforms the use of 
predetermined percentages regardless of project size, definition level, or complexity. 
Risk analysis techniques can perform slightly better than the other methods when a pro-
ject tender is well defined. However, when a project is not well defined, risk analysis 
produces worse results than the other techniques (Burroughs & Juntima, 2004, p. 36). 
 
There are also cost estimation techniques, which take an outside view. Flyvbjerg (2008) 
suggests Reference Class Forecasting (RCF), as he locates the problem in behavioral bias 
and not inaccuracy of estimates as of such. He underlines this with the fact that substan-
tial resources have been spent over several decades to improve data and forecasting 
models. Nevertheless, the accuracy of forecasts has not improved. Bias will be further 
explained in Chapter 2.2.2. RCF is a method for debiasing forecasts by systematically tak-
ing an outside view on planned actions, which is possible by identifying a relevant refer-
ence class of past, similar projects. To find appropriate reference class projects is difficult 
when new and unfamiliar technologies are used in a project. However, most projects use 
well-known technologies. As a next step, a probability distribution for the selected ref-
erence class must be established. Finally, the specific project must be compared with the 
reference class distribution. The distribution shows the most likely outcome for the par-
ticular project, whose cost must be evaluated. This technique doesn’t forecast specific 
uncertain events that will affect the project. The idea is to place the project in a statistical 
distribution of outcomes from the class of reference projects. Research suggests that an 
outside view produces significantly more accurate results than an inside view. However, 
most companies use the inside view in planning new projects, as it is the conventional 
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and intuitive approach to focus on the project itself and its details. Moreover, it is chal-
lenging to assemble a valid dataset that will allow reliable forecasts (pp. 6-10). 
 
Control systems need to review the cost estimates before and after they are approved. 
Low cost estimates indicate that the control systems haven’t worked as intended 
(Segelod, 2018, p. 9). The budget, which is determined by the cost estimate, can be cru-
cial for the success or failure of the project, as it determines the resources given to peo-
ple to complete their tasks. When monitoring budgets, there are some factors which 
should be considered: Inflation during long-term projects, unfavorable changes in cur-
rency exchange rates, failing to get form prices from suppliers and contractors, un-
planned personnel costs including overtime which incurred in keeping the project on 
schedule, and unanticipated training costs and consulting fees (Luecke, 2004, pp. 64-66, 
132). After spending a quarter, or at the most a third of the project budget, the project 
manager should have a good understanding of the final cost. The final cost is reported 
when the project is finished (Segelod, 2018, pp. 11-13). 
 
 
2.2 Explanations for cost overrun 
Possible explanations for cost overrun can either be of a technical- or behavioral nature. 
In the technical category, the actors are assumed to evaluate information and make de-
cisions based on rational reasoning. The behavioral category suggests that emotions 
drive decision making and have at least a decisive influence (Segelod, 2018, p. 59). In this 
chapter, these two categories are explained and illustrated by examples. 
 
 
2.2.1 Technical explanations for cost overrun 
Cost overrun belonging into the technical category of explanations mainly results be-
cause of problems predicting the future and is therefore considered an “honest” error 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 11). In this case, estimating the project cost causes problems 
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because of numerous uncertainties (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, p. 172). The leading causes 
for cost overrun and, therefore, sources for uncertainties in the technical category are: 
 
• Inappropriate forecasting techniques, which doesn’t provide realistic cost esti-
mates (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 4). 
 
• Price rises in the future, which are difficult to predict (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 
11). The cost of equipment, critical construction materials, and skilled workers 
can increase throughout a project. Price rises are likely when projects are imple-
mented during periods of strong economic growth and tight employment mar-
kets, which lead to scarcity and rising prices (Siemiatycki, 2015, pp. 3-4). 
 
• Poor project -planning, -design, and -implementation, which can be the conse-
quence of a lack of experience of the actors involved (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 
11). 
 
• Disputes between the client and the contractor, or the contractor and multiple 
subcontractors. The arguments include disagreement about work quality and re-
sponsibility for errors made in a project, which lead to schedule delays and rising 
project costs (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 3). 
 
• Incomplete estimations, which are often the result of inadequate data 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 11). Scarce data can, furthermore, lead to inaccurate 
underlying assumptions (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 4). Tenders must possibly be made 
before all technical feasibility- and engineering studies are completed. This cir-
cumstance leads to higher costs during project implementation when more de-
tails about the project are confirmed. The explanation can be that governments 
want urgent projects to get started quickly or try to meet funding deadlines or 




• Scope changes that occurred in the project and were not predicted. These 
changes can lead to additional costs (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 11). The cost over-
run can be the result of poor risk management, when change is not effectively 
managed (Smith et al., 2013, pp. 1-2). Responsible for change can be external 
factors, such as market demand, price changes, and new regulations. Internal 
characteristics, such as changes in the original design, can also be responsible 
(Segelod, 2018, p. 73). Change orders to the project must be negotiated and ap-
proved between the client and the contractor. This process can be time-consum-
ing, costly, and lead to conflicts (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 3). 
 
• An inappropriate organizational structure of the company, or a lousy decision-
making and planning processes. They lead to inefficiency, which results in costs 
higher than expected. In these cases, the organization is not able to adapt well 
enough to changing- circumstances, accountability and control, and planning 
(Cantarelli et al., 2010, pp. 11-12). 
 
• Project delays, caused by strikes, challenges in sourcing materials, or skilled 
workers, or disputes among different contractors and sub-contractors 
(Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 4). 
 
• Unforeseen events, as extreme weather conditions, pandemics, or accidents, 
can delay projects and increase the cost (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 4). 
 
• Poor supplier management, when supplier- and sub-contractor performance is 
not monitored and reported. Consequently, it is not possible to select partners 
with a proven track record of similar projects (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 4). 
 
The planning and implementation of a project is a process of reducing uncertainty. The 
uncertainty will be diminished, the more information the actors get and the greater the 
knowledge of how to realize the project. The technology involved, and the way how the 
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actors learn more about the project, influence this process. The sources for uncertainty 
presented above can be divided into static- and dynamic uncertainty. The difference is 
that dynamic uncertainty can be dealt with during the planning period, but static uncer-
tainty is a source of unexpected events throughout the whole planning and implemen-
tation process. Static uncertainty can’t be reduced because it derives from external fac-
tors, which cannot be entirely avoided by careful planning. Static uncertainty might 
cause changes in project plans. Examples of static uncertainty are inflation, war, strikes, 
flooding, accidents, political uncertainty, or instability (Segelod, 2018, pp. 59, 74-76). 
 
There are categories of projects which are more likely to cause cost overruns because of 
uncertainty (Segelod, 2018, pp. 74-76): 
 
1. Projects which need to develop knowledge new to the world. The cost overrun 
is usually higher, the greater the advance in technical knowledge, which is neces-
sary to implement the project. This likely not only applies to technical knowledge 
but also new knowledge and technology in general. Such projects contain the risk 
that surprises cannot be wholly avoided during project implementation, no mat-
ter how good the planning is. It can be distinguished between implementation 
and development projects. Implementation projects can be based on existing 
knowledge to reduce dynamic uncertainty, whereas development projects re-
quire progress in new knowledge. If new knowledge can be acquired and devel-
oped during the planning period, dynamic uncertainty in development projects 
can be reduced (Segelod, 2018, pp. 71, 74). 
 
2. Complex projects. The cost overrun is usually higher, the higher the complexity 
of the project. The existence of dependencies characterizes this category. These 
dependencies are sub-projects and activities, which must be completed in time 
so that other activities are not delayed. The complexity can be measured with 
the number of dependencies in a project, how interrelated these dependencies 
are, and with their negotiability. The dependencies can occur due to both internal 
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and external actors, processes, and events. Complex projects have a lot of de-
pendencies and allow little slack in time and trade-off between goals. The size of 
a project is not a primary factor for complexity, even though large and high-tech 
projects tend to be more complicated. Complex projects have dynamic uncer-
tainty, which can be resolved during the planning period (Segelod, 2018, pp. 71-
72, 74). 
 
3. Projects where actors have no experience in similar projects. When the actors 
planning, estimating, and implementing the projects don’t have experience of 
similar projects, the cost overrun tends to be larger. These are usually projects 
which are one-of-a-kind or projects that are implemented infrequently. It is eas-
ier to cost standardized items and work processes when data from earlier, similar 
projects are available. This category is categorized by the need of the actors to 
acquire and develop new knowledge to reduce dynamic uncertainty. The projects 
in this category are not necessarily unique to the world or exceptionally complex, 
but the actors involved don’t have the required knowledge (Segelod, 2018, pp. 
72, 74-75). 
 
4. Projects which are affected by exogenous static uncertainty. These are projects 
where cost overrun occurred because of unforeseen events, such as unantici-
pated price increases or inflation, war, strikes, flooding, etc. (Segelod, 2018, p. 
74). 
 
5. Systems innovations projects. These are projects which are affected by static un-
certainty. The development of electric vehicles could be taken as an example. The 
new vehicle system faces exogenous- and endogenous uncertainties. Exogenous 
uncertainties are, for example, the buyers’ willingness to pay more for a more 
environmentally friendly vehicle, or whether subsidies and advantages are of-
fered to owners and manufacturers of electric cars. Examples for endogenous 
uncertainties are related to actors developing the required infrastructure, such 
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as charging stations, service and repair, and a cluster of firms developing compo-
nents for electric vehicles. (Segelod, 2018, p. 75) 
 
 
2.2.2 Behavioral explanations for cost overrun 
Inaccuracy in cost estimation is not merely caused by incomplete information and honest 
errors regarding cost and complexity, as the technical explanations suggest. Behavioral 
science explains cost overrun in human bias, psychological and political (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2018, pp. 183-184). A lot of research on heuristics and biases was, for example, done by 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (Gilovich et al., 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Kahneman, 2011). Behavioral science sees the root cause for cost overrun in the fact that 
planners and managers repetitively keep underestimating the cost of scope changes, 
complicated interfaces, archaeology, geology, bad weather, business cycles, etc. The cost 
is underestimated, even though the planner and managers know that these factors can 
influence the cost. The problem is that planners often underestimate these factors and 
possible mitigation measures due to optimism bias, planning fallacy, and strategic mis-
representation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, p. 183). Especially in more complex projects and 
in projects based on new technologies, cost-, benefit-, and time- forecasts are systemat-
ically over-optimistic in comparison to less-complex projects (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, p. 
172). 
 
Behavioral explanations can further be divided into the following categories: 
 
• Psychological explanations 
Optimism bias and planning fallacy belong in the category of psychological expla-
nations (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 12). The optimism bias is a cognitive predispo-
sition found with most people to judge future events in a more positive light than 
is appropriate by experience. Planning fallacy means that people underestimate 
the costs, completion times, and risks of planned actions while overestimating 
the benefits (Flyvbjerg, 2008, pp. 6-7). This condition can also be called delusion 
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(Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, p. 172). When previous data and experience are missing, 
and the uncertainty is therefore high, cost estimates are based more on hope and 
vision than on information. The less is known about the actual cost, the more a 
cost estimation is based on belief (Segelod, 2018, p. 87). The lack of information 
makes the estimates susceptible to bias, which leads to cost underestimation, 
which leads to cost overrun. 
 
• Political-economic explanations 
In this category, the cause for cost overrun is explained in terms of strategic mis-
representation. It means that forecasters and planners deliberately and strategi-
cally overestimate the benefits and underestimate the cost of a project (Flyvbjerg, 
2008, p. 6). Such projects are unlikely to stay on budget or time and hardly deliver 
the promised benefits (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, p. 173). The difference between 
economic and political explanations is relatively small, only their starting point 
diverge. Economic explanations are based on the lack of incentives and resources, 
whereas political explanations are based on interests and power for utility maxi-
mation (Cantarelli et al., 2010, pp. 12-13). 
 
From the contractor’s perspective, a political-economic explanation of deliber-
ately underestimating cost is strategic behavior. Underestimating the costs in-
creases the chance of getting the project awarded (Cantarelli et al., 2010, pp. 11-
12). This behavior can be alluring when the primary interest is to win the tender, 
which is usually achieved by offering the lowest possible price (Flyvbjerg et al., 
2009, p. 179). An explanation could be the prestige, which follows from the de-
livery of a particular project. The too-low bid price leads to high cost overruns, 
which must not be a problem if the losses are supposed to be made up in future 
projects. But this should not be a common practice for most of the projects, as it 
is not sustainable. Furthermore, once contractors got the contract awarded, they 
know that they might be able to drive up the price later through change orders 
(Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 5). 
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There are several political-economic reasons for cost overrun, which are not fea-
sible from the contractor’s perspective, but instead of the customer’s perspective. 
The customer as project owner might need approval and funding for the overall 
project. Therefore, project promoters like forecasters, planners, or politicians 
might systematically distort or misstate facts, which can also be called lying in 
response to incentives in the budget process (Jones & Euske, 1991, p. 437). Lying 
increases the likelihood that their project, and not the one of a competitor, gains 
approval and funding (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 6). From the project owner’s perspec-
tive, there is often a lack of incentives to provide accurate estimates, as exact 
figures decrease the chance of receiving funding for the project. Decision-makers 
must, furthermore, often choose between projects because of a lack of resources, 
which leads to competition. Project promoters, therefore, deliberately underes-
timate costs to make their projects look more interesting and enhance the chance 
of being selected. It is also possible that forecasts are manipulated to advocate a 
project (Cantarelli et al., 2010, pp. 11-14). For example, a politician wants to com-
pete successfully for a federal grant and therefore lets adjusting the cost figures 
downward (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, p. 184). All this is encouraged by the fact that 
once a project is started, few are ever halted (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 5). 
 
Strategic misrepresentation is enabled because of the lack of consequences that 
is related to this kind of behavior. There are no consequences due to the lack of 
coordination, the lack of long-term commitment, and the lack of discipline of the 
people involved. Organizational and political pressures are additional reasons. 
Forecasts are adjusted to achieve the most politically or organizationally attrac-
tive outcomes. Asymmetric information is another cause. Decision-makers have 
little information and therefore rely on the data obtained from forecasts, which 
allows forecasters to misrepresent information (Cantarelli et al., 2010, p. 12). 
 
Optimism bias and strategic misrepresentation are both deceptions. The difference is 
that strategic misrepresentation is intentional; optimism bias is not. Optimism bias is a 
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form of self-deception. Nevertheless, the result of the deception is the same, namely 
inaccurate forecasts, which lead to cost overrun (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 6). 
 
 
2.3 How to mitigate cost overrun 
2.3.1 Technical explanations 
As explained in Chapter 2.2.1, technical explanations are mainly based on problems pre-
dicting the future. The problems occur because of numerous uncertainties. Thus, cost 
overrun can be mitigated by reducing dynamic uncertainty. Depending on the case, this 
could be done as follows: 
 
• Reduction of forecasting- and calculation errors. Forecasting errors can be re-
duced by having adequate data at disposal (Cantarelli et al., 2010, pp. 11, 13). 
Furthermore, proper risk management should already be in place in the tender-
ing process, as an early inclusion increases the probability of a successful out-
come of the project (Elkington & Smallman, 2002, p. 56). Moreover, the right 
forecasting method should be chosen, which allows adequate cost estimation. 
 
• Improvements in the planning process, project design, and implementation of 
the project. As shortcomings in this area are usually the result of a lack of expe-
rience, experienced staff is one way to achieve this. Furthermore, planning con-
cepts can help (Cantarelli et al., 2010, pp. 11, 13). 
 
• Improvements in the structure of the company. This point refers mainly to the 
way how decision-making works in the company. The decision-making must be 





• Enhancement of performance monitoring, reporting, and information sharing. 
Big data and analytics are getting increasingly important. Performance is being 
improved by methods that rely on collecting and statistically analyzing vast 
amounts of data. Therefore, there must be a systematic tracking implemented 
which compares cost and schedule estimates with the outcome. Systematic 
tracking enables institutional learning from experience and real-time information 
gathering, which improves decision-making. Sufficient data quality and infor-
mation management are required for reliable results. The data to be collected 
includes the type, size, and location of the project, companies and project man-
agers involved, significant scope changes, causes for cost overrun and schedule 
delays, quality and safety measures at the site, and long-term defects. Over time, 
large datasets are available, which can be statistically analyzed. As a result, trends 
relating to cost and quality can be seen, and the right conclusions can be drawn 
(Siemiatycki, 2015, pp. 5-6). 
 
• The hiring of a competent team for the implementation of the project. The 
team must have a proven track record of similar projects to be able to deliver the 
project within cost and time (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, p. 185). The track record has 
to be possessed by internal resources as well as external resources, such as sup-
pliers and sub-contractors. Furthermore, suitable suppliers must be chosen 
which can deliver materials on schedule, in the right quality, and for a low price. 
Therefore, supplier and sub-contractor performance must be tracked to select 
the right partners for future projects. They must have a strong record of deliver-
ing with the right quality, on budget, and schedule (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 4). 
 
The ways mentioned above to reduce uncertainty concerning technical explanations for 
cost overrun are reliable on appropriate technology and experienced employees. Thus, 
the reduction of uncertainty is backed by technology- and knowledge management. Por-
ter (1985) recognized that “everything a firm does involves technology of some sort” (p. 
62). Hence, it is essential to have effective technology management implemented, 
28 
 
which is the ability of a company to shape and accomplish its strategic and operational 
objectives through planning, directing control, and coordination of the development and 
implementation of technological capabilities. Technology can be a major source of com-
petitive advantage and growth for a company (Cetindamar et al., 2010, pp. 1-2). Espe-
cially for a technology-based company, a sustainable competitive advantage is not only 
reached through cost reduction and operational efficiency. The company must be able 
to manage its technology assets (Skilbeck & Cruickshank, 1997, p. 138). In combination 
with a highly motivated and adequately trained workforce, technology enables the com-
pany to adapt rapidly according to customer demands. Furthermore, new market oppor-
tunities can be accessed and developed. However, it is complex to integrate technologi-
cal considerations into business processes. There are various challenges associated with 
the management of technology. Possible risks include increased cost, complexity, and 
pace of technology advancement, increased diversity of technology sources, globaliza-
tion of competition and alliances, and the impact of information technology. On the 
other hand, these risks can also be an excellent opportunity for companies, which can 
fully exploit their technological potential (Cetindamar et al., 2010, pp. 1-2). 
 
Effective technology management requires experienced employees, which in turn re-
quires effective knowledge management. According to Zou and Lim (2002), knowledge 
management is defined as 
the management processes (including planning, organizing, implementing, con-
trolling, and evaluating) of creating, capturing, transferring, sharing, retrieving, 
and storing of data, information, knowledge experiences, and skills by using ap-
propriate information and network technology, with the endorsement of total in-
volvement in organizational learning to enable knowledge acquisition throughout 
the processes. (p. 1746) 
Knowledge is the ability to use information effectively. Only to possess the information 
required is not enough. Knowledge resides in the workforce of an organization and ag-
gregated it is called “organizational capability”, which is a critical attribute. Without ad-
equate knowledge, the individuals can’t perform an activity within a practical context 
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(Miller & Morris, 1999, pp. 94-95). A companies’ knowledge base includes its technolog-
ical competencies, its knowledge of customer needs, and supplier capabilities. These 
competencies include individual skills and experiences and the ways how things are done 
within the company. The competencies consist of various processes, procedures, rou-
tines, and structures existing in practice (Cetindamar et al., 2010, p. 9). The individuals 
are applying explicit and tacit knowledge to handle tools and technology in processes. 
Explicit knowledge is the knowledge written in books or discussed in classrooms and 
conference rooms. Tacit knowledge exists in an inexpressible form and is critical to suc-
cess in professional careers. It consists of experiences and the understanding of how 
something must “feel”. For example, one can’t know how it feels like to hold and use a 
hammer unless one has done it. Especially, one can’t say when it feels right (Miller & 
Morris, 1999, pp. 75, 94-95). 
 
 
Figure 1. Components of capability (Miller & Morris, 1999, p. 76). 
 
The different components of capability are illustrated in Figure 1. Capability is a combi-
nation of the right tools, the right technologies, efficient processes and practices, and 
the people with the knowledge required. Differences in capability can distinguish market 
leaders from followers, as it is the basis of good performance. Capability development 
has an impact and can improve speed, quality, and costs within existing product plat-
forms. Furthermore, it can generate discontinuous innovation and new dominant 
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designs (Miller & Morris, 1999, p. 76). Because knowledge and technology have such a 
significant impact on capability, and as a result on cost overruns, these aspects will be 
further examined in this thesis. 
 
 
2.3.2 Behavioral explanations 
As explained in Chapter 2.2.2, the leading causes for cost overrun according to behav-
ioral science are cost underestimation because of optimism bias, planning fallacy, and 
strategic misrepresentation. 
 
When it comes to optimism bias and planning fallacy, cost overrun can be mitigated by 
using forecasting methods that allow reliable, de-biased estimates of cost. This advice 
suggests that forecasters are irrational in a predictable way (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, pp. 
185, 188). Contractors are influenced by systemic biases in both project cost and return 
(Kim et al., 2008, p. 398). These biases must be considered to get more accurate cost 
estimates. Conventional cost estimation methods produce an error as well as bias, which 
is why they have a century-long track record of inaccuracy (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, pp. 185, 
188). Forecasts adopt an inside view, which means decision-makers have a strong ten-
dency to consider problems as unique and therefore focus on details of the current pro-
ject when creating solutions. An outside perspective, which ignores the specific details 
of the project and uses a broad reference class of similar projects for the forecast, miti-
gates bias (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, p. 173). Flyvbjerg (2008), therefore, suggests the Refer-
ence Class Forecasting method, as explained in Chapter 2.1.2. 
 
Cost overrun based on strategic misrepresentation can be mitigated by establishing an 
incentive structure, which encourages to stay on budget (Flyvbjerg et al., 2018, p. 185). 
The incentive structure can be established by appropriate contracts and procurement 
models (Siemiatycki, 2015, p. 8). Furthermore, accountability must be provided. When 
multiple people are responsible for the outcome of a project, it might be difficult to hold 
someone accountable for a bad result (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, pp. 173, 180). The incentive 
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structure should, therefore, be established in a way that accurate forecasts are rewarded, 
and inaccurate ones are punished (Flyvbjerg, 2008, p. 19). Also, transparency must be 
enhanced, which means information regarding the specifics of the projects must be dis-
closed. The disclosure can be achieved through financial and non-financial rewards. 
Moreover, forecasts tend to be unbiased when there is a good learning environment. A 
good learning environment means that similar decisions are taken regularly, to be able 
to learn from them (Flyvbjerg et al., 2009, pp. 173, 181-185). 
 
As explained in Chapter 1.1, the case company is participating in tenders. The competi-
tion for the award of contract usually leaves little flexibility to increase the bid price to 
mitigate cost overrun. Therefore, there is little room to reduce optimism bias, planning 
fallacy, and strategic misrepresentation in cost estimations. Furthermore, there are 
fewer incentives for strategic misrepresentation from the contractor’s perspective than 
from the customer’s perspective. Consequently, behavioral explanations play a less 
prominent role for contractors compared to the client, who must estimate the cost of 
the whole project to make an investment decision. The case company must focus on 
staying on the budget, mostly determined by the market. Keeping the budget can be 
done through a good operative performance during the planning and implementation of 
the project. Therefore, the methods used in this thesis mainly focus on locating causes, 
which ultimately reduce uncertainty, as explained in the technical explanations for cost 
overrun. Nevertheless, adequate cost estimation shouldn’t be neglected. Respondent 16 
confirms that if a higher price would have been offered, it is not sure that the case com-
pany would have gotten the projects awarded. In principle, it is the market price which 
is offered. The profit margins are smaller than in other businesses. In this competitive 




Several methods are used and combined to locate the root causes of cost overrun in the 
examined projects. The methodology is thoroughly explained in this chapter. It mainly 
concentrates on technical explanations for cost overrun by locating the critical operative 
processes within the projects. Besides, there is also a method introduced to examine the 
impact of the used technologies on cost overrun. The methodology used provides a way 
to turn qualitative data into quantitative data, which allows the empirical research. 
 
 
3.1 Operations Strategy 
Operations are the resources that create and deliver products and services based on 
customer requests. A company sets the role, objectives, and activities of the processes 
in the operations strategy (Slack et al., 2013, p. 70). The resources are allocated based 
on how the company competes in the market and how it estimates its business environ-
ment. In a successful operations strategy, opportunities are identified and prioritized 
while being aware of possible trade-offs (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, pp. 65-66). To fol-
low a successful operations strategy, which fits the organization, is crucial. It contributes 
to the success of the projects and can, therefore, mitigate cost overrun. 
 
According to Miles et al. (1978), there are four strategic types of organizations: Defend-
ers, Analyzers, Prospectors, and Reactors. They all have their configuration of technolo-
gies, structures, and processes that are consistent with their market strategy. Even if or-
ganizations operate in the same industry, they can fit in different categories of strategic 
types and therefore differentiate themselves from each other. The pure forms of strate-
gic types are as follows: 
 
• Defenders 
The focus of the Defenders is on cost (Takala et al., 2012). They like to operate in 
an environment where a stable form of organization is suitable. Therefore, they 
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produce only a limited set of products directed at a narrow segment of the total 
potential market. They react aggressively to prevent competitors from entering 
their niche market. The reaction comprises economic actions like competitive 
pricing or high-quality products. They also tend to ignore developments and 
trends outside of their niche, as they prefer to grow through market penetration 
and limited product development. As a result, they can carve out and maintain a 
small niche within the industry, which is difficult for competitors to penetrate. 
Most of the available resources of the Defender go into the efficient production 
and distribution of goods and services, which is usually achieved by technological 
efficiency. It is ensured by developing a single core technology, which is highly 
cost-efficient. The top-management is dominated by production and cost-control 
specialists to ensure efficiency. This strategic type is more common in industries 
where technological change is not an issue. The Defender gets in trouble if its 
market shifts dramatically, as there is little capacity for locating and exploiting 
new opportunities (Miles et al., pp. 550-551). 
 
• Prospectors 
Prospectors focus on quality (Takala et al., 2012). Compared to the Defenders, 
the Prospectors have an oppositional approach of reacting to the chosen envi-
ronment. Their prime capability is to find and exploit new product and market 
opportunities and therefore maintain a reputation as an innovator in product and 
market development. This capability might be as important or even more im-
portant than high profitability. As failures associated with a sustained product 
and market innovation can’t be avoided, it might be challenging to attain the 
profit levels of the more efficient Defenders. The area of expertise is broad and 
in a continuous state of development. To be able to survey a wide range of envi-
ronmental conditions, trends, and events, the Prospector invests heavily in indi-
viduals and groups who scan the environment for potential opportunities. 
Change is the way for this type of organization to distinguish itself from compet-
itors. It requires flexibility in both its technology and administrative system. The 
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Prospector, therefore, creates multiple prototypical technologies. They all have a 
low degree of routinization and mechanization. They must be able to deploy and 
coordinate resources among numerous projects. It is not possible to plan and 
control the operations of the entire organization centrally. Therefore, the top 
management is dominated by marketing and research & development experts. 
The planning is characterized as broad and oriented towards results rather than 
methods. The project structures have, amongst others, a low degree of formali-
zation, decentralized control, and horizontal as well as vertical communication. 
The risks of this approach are low profitability and overextension of resources. 
The efficiency of a Prospector is compromised, as multiple technologies are pre-
sent (Miles et al., 1978, pp. 551-553). 
 
• Analyzers 
The focus of this type is on balancing quality, cost, and time (Takala et al., 2012). 
The Analyzer is a combination of the Defender and Prospector types and can be 
a reasonable alternative to these other strategies. An Analyzer tries to minimize 
risk while maximizing the opportunity for profit. The Analyzer, therefore, com-
bines the strengths of both the Defender and the Prospector. It is a strategy that 
is difficult to implement, especially in industries with rapid market- and techno-
logical change. An Analyzer tries to “balance” between the two extremes, De-
fender and Prospector. Such a company attempts to locate and exploit new prod-
uct and market opportunities while simultaneously maintaining a base of tradi-
tional products and customers. The Analyzer is open towards new products and 
markets but waits until it is assured that they are relevant, which is achieved by 
imitation. This kind of company adopts only the most successful product or mar-
ket innovations, which are developed by prominent Prospectors. The main share 
of the revenue is generated by a relatively stable set of products and customers, 
which is a Defender characteristic. The right mix of technological flexibility and 
technological stability must be found. The stable part achieves cost-efficiency 
through a functional organization, high levels of standardization, routinization, 
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and mechanization. The flexible part has a low degree of routinization and auto-
mation. The Analyzer often uses a matrix organization structure to accommodate 
both stable and dynamic areas of operation in its design and processes. As a dual 
technological core must be established, the management must operate funda-
mentally different planning, control, and reward systems simultaneously. This 
balance of stability and flexibility makes it difficult to move fully in either direc-
tion if required. The risks are, therefore, both inefficiency and ineffectiveness if 
the necessary balance can’t be kept (Miles et al., 1978, pp. 553-557). 
 
• Reactors 
The strategy types described above are all proactive to the environment in their 
way. The reactor, however, adjusts to its environment in both an inconsistent and 
unstable way. There are no response mechanisms available to a changing envi-
ronment. As a result, there is continual instability. Reactors keep reacting inap-
propriately to environmental change and uncertainty, which leads to poor out-
comes. The reactor strategy is a result of improperly pursuing one of the other 
three strategies. There are some reasons to become a reactor. The top manage-
ment may not have clearly articulated the organization’s strategy. Or the man-
agement doesn’t entirely shape the organization’s structure and processes to fit 
a chosen strategy. The market, technological-, and administrative decisions must 
be aligned correctly in an operations strategy. Otherwise, the strategy is only a 
statement, not a useful guide on how to approach it. The third reason for insta-
bility is that the management keeps its current strategy type, even though there 
are fundamental changes in the environmental conditions (Miles et al., 1978, pp. 
557-558). 
 
Which operations strategy to pursuit must be primarily based on market needs and re-
quirements. Different companies focus on different capabilities and competitive priori-
ties (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 66). According to Slack et al. (2004), there are four 
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main competitive priorities, namely Quality, Cost, Time, and Flexibility, which will be fur-
ther described in Chapter 3.2. 
 
The available resources of a company must be aligned to the chosen strategy type, which 
enables to exploit its advantages as good as possible. These resources allow the company 
to prosper and mitigate cost overrun in its projects. The following subchapters explain 




3.2 RAL concept 
The key which strategy type to choose in the decision-making process of operations man-
agers is the competitive priorities. They indicate the strategic emphasis on developing 
individual capabilities, which improve the market position of a company. The trend to-
wards global competition, focus on customer satisfaction and quality excellence, 
amongst others, creates an image of the future company as “lean” or “agile”. Everything 
a company does must add value for the customer. The main fields of interest for the 
customer are price, quality, service, and delivery (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
The Responsiveness, Agility, and Leanness (RAL) model is a holistic and multi-focused 
operations strategy tool based on business goals. It was created to understand the suc-
cess factors of logistics but can be applied to operations strategies and operations man-
agement (Takala et al., 2012). The RAL model can be seen in Figure 2. It is considered to 




Figure 2. The RAL model (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
The dimensions of the RAL model are: 
 
• Responsiveness 
The responsiveness is the speed by which the system satisfies unanticipated re-
quirements (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
• Agility 
The agility is the speed by which the system adapts to the optimal cost structure 
(Takala et al., 2012). 
 
• Leanness 




Quality means that things are done right. There is design quality and process 
quality. The design quality is the set of features that a product or service has and 
the part of quality which the customer experiences and judges. The process qual-
ity is related to the quality inside the operations and can lead to cost reduction 
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and dependability increase (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 66). Dependability 
means that things are done in time, and customers, therefore, receive their goods 
and services when they are promised (Slack et al., 2013, p. 49). Dependability is 
a direct consequence when fewer mistakes are made during the operation pro-
cess, and hence less time must be spent on fixing these mistakes. There will also 
be less dissatisfaction and confusion inside the company (Takala, Shylina, et al., 
2013, p. 66). 
 
• Cost 
Even if a company is not competing for cost leadership, the cost is always an es-
sential objective for operations management. Savings in the operation’s cost can 
directly be added to profits. Operation costs can occur on staff, facilities, technol-
ogy, equipment, and materials (Slack et al., 2013, p. 55). 
 
• Time 
Time means the duration between the point when customers are requesting 
products or services until they receive them. Advantages of short lead-time are 
that customers are more likely to order, that they will pay more, or that they re-
ceive a greater benefit for their order. Moreover, the time aspect is also essential 
inside the operation of a company, which means there should be fast decision 
making and quick movement of materials and information. Speed reduces inven-
tories and reduces risks, as accurate forecasting is easier, the quicker the through-
put time of a process (Slack et al., pp. 47-48). 
 
• Flexibility 
Flexibility is the ability to change the operation in some way. The change can be 
related to what the operation does, how it is doing it, or when it is doing it. A 
company must possess different kinds of flexibility. Product/service flexibility 
means that the operation must be able to introduce new or modified products 
or services. Mix flexibility is the operation’s ability to produce a wide range of mix 
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of products and services. Volume flexibility means the ability to change its level 
of output or activity to produce different quantities or volumes of products and 
services. The operation must be capable of changing the timing of delivery of its 
services and products, which is called delivery flexibility. Flexibility inside the op-
eration saves time, maintains dependability, and can save costs (Slack et al., 2013, 
pp. 53-54). 
 
Quality, time, cost, and flexibility are proportional (%) values. They are used to compare 
all types of companies with each other (Takala et al., 2012). Sub-criteria, which belong 
to the competitive priorities, Quality, Cost, Time, and Flexibility, can be seen in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Competitive Priorities of the RAL model (Takala & Uusitalo, 2012, p. 57). 
 
 
3.3 Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
To get a ranking of the RAL components Quality, Cost, Time, and Flexibility, and therefore 
an overview of the competitive priorities of the company, the Analytical Hierarchy Pro-
cess (AHP) is used. By ranking the components, it can be seen which preference has been 
given to which component (Saaty, 2008, p. 84). The priorities of the components allow 




The AHP model consists of five steps of decision-making in an organized way and thus 
generates priorities (Saaty, 2008, p. 85): 
 
1. Problem definition and determination of what kind of knowledge is sought (Saaty, 
2008, p. 85). 
 
2. Development of a decision hierarchy with different levels. At the top of the hier-
archy is the goal of the decision (Saaty, 2008, p. 85). 
 
3. Construction of a pairwise comparison matrix. Each element of an upper level is 
used to compare the elements of the next lower level concerning it (Saaty, 2008, 
p. 85). 
 
4. Priorities obtained from the comparisons are used to weight the priorities in the 
next lower level. This approach must be made for every element. The weighted 
values for each element in the level below are added to obtain its global priority. 
The process of weighing and adding is continued until the final priorities of the 
alternatives at the lowest level are received (Saaty, 2008, p. 85). 
 
 




The relative weights are determined by making pairwise comparisons using a preference 
scale. The scale goes from 1 to 9, as illustrated in Table 1. One factor can be up to nine 
times as important as another factor (Rangone, 1996, pp. 108-109). 
 
Table 1. The measurement scale for the AHP method. 
 
 
As all the relevant decision criteria are included in the AHP method, their pairwise com-
parison allows determining trade-offs between objectives. It consists of the knowledge 
and expertise of the respondents in the priority setting process by utilizing their subjec-
tive judgments. An overall priority of each alternative is achieved by summing up the 
results (Takala et al., 2007, pp. 331-332). 
 
The results of the ranking are used for the Sustainable Competitive Advantage Model 
(Chapter 3.5) and the Sand Cone model (Chapter 3.6.2). 
 
 
3.4 Sense and Respond Methodology 
It can be useful to analyze a company from the resource side rather than from the prod-
uct side (Wernerfelt, 1984, p. 171). Operations strategy provides a broad framework for 
how a company can prioritize and utilize its resources. The ability of a company to quickly 
adjust its processes and allocate its resources is crucial.  
 
The Sense and Respond (S&R) Methodology was introduced to develop the operative 
management system (Liu & Takala, 2012). It helps companies to understand their 




Very strongly preferred 7
Extremely preferred 9
Intermediate values to reflect compromise 2, 4, 6, 8
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business situation better. As a result, it enables a fast and more precise reaction to short-
comings (Takala, Muhos, et al., 2013, p. 62). The S&R method “senses” the critical pro-
cesses of the operations management, which allows developing them effectively. This 
approach leads to a competitive advantage (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 65). The term 
“Sense and Respond” was first introduced by Haeckel (1992), who argued that compa-
nies would get increasingly service-centered and therefore need to change the way how 
their businesses are structured, measured, and managed. The S&R thinking was later 
developed by Bradley and Nolan (1998) and Markides (2000) to be able to analyze the 
dynamics of business performances and strategies. 
 
The S&R method can be applied as a questionnaire (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 66). 
The S&R questionnaire was developed by Rautiainen and Takala (2003). It was evolved 
by Ranta and Takala (2007), paying attention to controlling and evaluating the company’s 
internal and external attributes from experience and expectation perspective. The ques-
tionnaire defines attributes that represent market needs. It enables them to react to the 
present important attributes in a way that they develop and change in the right direction 
(Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 67). The format of the questionnaire can be seen in Table 
2. The respondent must evaluate the expectation and experience of every performance 
attribute. The evaluation is on a scale of 1 to 10 in the defined duration. Furthermore, 
the direction of development must be determined on a scale of “worse”, “same”, or “bet-
ter”. For the analysis, the counts of “better” and “worse” are derived into percentage 
weights (Liu & Liang, 2015, p. 1027). 
 













Scale: 1 = low, 10 = high Direction of development
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Several indexes were introduced to evaluate the questionnaire. Ranta and Takala (2007) 
developed the Critical Factor Index (CFI) as an enhancement of the Emphasized Imple-
mentation Index created by Rautiainen and Takala (2003). Nadler and Takala (2010) de-
veloped the Balanced Critical Factor Index (BCFI) based on the CFI. Liu et al. (2011) added 
trend research into the study and therefore created the Scaled Critical Factor Index (SCFI). 
Finally, Liu and Liang (2015) further developed the SCFI, which led to the creation of the 
Normalized Scaled Critical Factor Index (NSCFI). These indexes can be used to optimize 
strategic adjustments and therefore support the fast-strategic decision-making process. 
The CFIs are composed of several indexes, which must be calculated (Takala, Shylina, et 
al., 2013, pp. 66-67). The following equations are part of calculating the CFIs: 
 
• Gap index 
This index helps to understand the gap between the experience and the expec-
tation of a specific attribute (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 2013, p. 49). A value of one 
means that there is no gap. A value above one indicates that experiences are 
lower than expectations and a value below one means that experiences are 





− 1|   (1) 
 
• Development index 
This index shows the direction of the company’s development, which means if an 
attribute’s development has a positive or negative trend compared to the old 
situation (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 2013, p. 49). When the value is one, the per-
formance remains at the same level. A value above one means that the perfor-
mance is worse, and a value below one means that the performance is better (Liu 
& Liang, 2015, p. 1027). 
 




• Importance index 
The importance index illustrates the importance of an attribute for a company by 
showing how high the expectation towards an attribute is (Takala, Koskinen, et 
al., 2013, p. 49). The scale goes from 0 to 1, with large values indicating high ex-




   (3) 
 
• Performance index 
This index shows how well the performance of an attribute was according to the 
experiences of the respondents (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 2013, p. 49). The scale 
goes from 0 to 1, in which a larger value stands for better performance (Liu & 




   (4) 
 
• The standard deviation of expectation index (for CFI and BCFI) 
This index discloses if the expectations of the respondents towards an attribute 
are similar, or if the expectations differ from each other (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 




+ 1    (5) 
 
• The standard deviation of experience index (for CFI and BCFI) 
This index shows if the experiences of the respondents towards an attribute are 
similar, or if the experiences differ from each other (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 




+ 1    (6) 
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• Gap index’ (for NSCFI) 
This is an improved Gap index for the calculation of the NSCFI (Liu & Liang, 




10    (7) 
 
• Development index’ (for NSCFI) 
This is the improved Development index for the calculation of the NSCFI (Liu & 
Liang, 2015, p. 1026). 
 
2(𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑠𝑒%−𝑏𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑟%)   (8) 
 
The presented indexes enable to calculate, CFI, BCFI, SCFI, and NSCFI, which have been 
validated in empirical studies involving more than 100 case studies (Liu & Liang, 2015, 
p. 1026): 
 
• Critical Factor Index (CFI) 
This index was developed to find the critical attributes and areas of an organiza-
tion (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 68). 
 
𝑠𝑡𝑑{𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒}∗𝑠𝑡𝑑{𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛}
𝐺𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥∗𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡∗𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
   (9) 
 
• Balanced Critical Factor Index (BCFI) 
The BCFI is an enhancement to the CFI (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, pp. 67-68). 
Compared to the CFI, it lowers the strong influence of the standard deviation and 
increases the weight of the experience section (Nadler & Takala, 2010, p. 1334). 
 
𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒)∗𝑠𝑡𝑑(𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)∗𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥∗𝐺𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥∗𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥




• Scaled Critical Factor Index (SCFI) 
The SCFI was developed to solve the problems which occur in the BCFI when the 
number of respondents is narrow and limited (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 68). 
The SCFI has been validated to have better sensitivity, accuracy, and wider toler-
ance of sample size (Liu & Liang, 2015, p. 1025). 
 
𝑎∗∗ 𝑏∗∗𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥∗𝐺𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥∗𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
   (11) 
 
where 














𝑛 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
• Normalized Scaled Critical Factor Index (NSCFI) 
The SCFI was further improved and led to the development of the NSCFI (Liu & 













𝐺𝑎𝑝 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥′∗𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥′∗𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥
   (12) 
 
 where 
𝑛 = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
The results of the questionnaire calculated by one of the CFIs can be illustrated in a bar 
chart. The bars are in the colors of a traffic light, as shown in Figure 5. Red attributes are 
critical, must be thoroughly examined, and additional resources should be attributed to 
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them (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 87). Green attributes are balanced. Yellow attrib-
utes are over-resourced, and it must be considered if these attributes can be allocated 
more effectively. An equally distributed resource allocation is considered to be ideal 
(Takala, Koskinen, et al., 2013, p. 48). The average resource level is defined by dividing 
the whole resource, which is 100%, to the total number of attributes. The upper bound 
of a balanced attribute, which takes the green color, is calculated by adding 1/3 of the 
average resource level to the average resource level. The lower bound is found when 1/3 
of the average resource level is subtracted from the average resource level. CFI values 
below the lower bound are defined as under-resourced and take the red color. CFIs that 
are higher than the upper bound are determined to be over-resourced and take the yel-
low color (Liu & Takala, 2012, pp. 29-30). 
 
 
Figure 5. Example of the resource allocation of a company based on BCFI (Tilabi et al., 
2019, p. 136). 
 
The strategic types defined by Miles et al. (1978) are integrated into the Sense and Re-
spond methodology by assigning one of the dimensions (Quality, Cost, Time, or Flexibil-
ity) of the RAL model to the performance attributes. The RAL dimension is chosen for 
the performance attribute, which represents its focus best. This approach is used to 
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determine the operations strategy of the company examined, using the Manufacturing 
Strategy Index described in the next chapter (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 2013, p. 46). 
 
In this thesis, the S&R methodology is used to locate the critical attributes within the 
projects. The method is an excellent indicator to understand which attributes require 
special attention. The assumption is that by allocating more resources to the root causes 
for the critical attributes and therefore improving them, the cost overrun can be reduced. 
Cost overruns occur directly or indirectly because of the critical performance attributes, 
indicated in red. 
 
 
3.5 Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA) Method 
To construct and pursue a sustainable competitive advantage, organizations must use 
their available resources and capabilities. In the resource-based view, a company 
achieves a competitive edge when optimally using its heterogenic strategical resources. 
As these resources are not entirely mobile across companies, this heterogeneity can be 
long-lasting. The resources of a company include all assets, capabilities, organizational 
processes, company attributes, information, knowledge, etc., which are in its control. A 
company has a sustainable competitive advantage when it can implement a value-creat-
ing strategy. Furthermore, no current or potential competitor should be able to imple-
ment it simultaneously and duplicate the benefits of the strategy (Barney, 1991, pp. 99-
102). 
 
The Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA) method assures that the resources of the 
company are operating according to the company’s strategy (Takala, Muhos, et al., 2013, 
p. 62). Besides, the method offers a possibility to see which strategy type may bring a 
better business performance to the company. It is also a way to check whether all units 
follow the general strategy if the method is used to analyze several branches of a com-
pany (Takala, Liu, et al., 2013, p. 1243). The same applies when different projects of a 
company are examined. 
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Success in the market over a long-term period requires a company to make decisions 
about how to allocate its resources. The resource allocation allows the company to de-
fine its position in the market by determining an operational strategy. Skinner (1969) 
introduced the so-called Manufacturing strategy, which is an integrated part of calculat-
ing the SCA value and systematically links up manufacturing with corporate strategy. The 
model enables to evaluate the competitive priorities of the company, to reach competi-
tive advantages in the market. The evaluation allows a classification of the company or 
examined unit into one of the strategy types, Analyzer, Defender, Prospector, or Reactor 
(Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 68). The strategy types were already described in Chapter 
3.1. Manufacturing strategy can also be applied to the project-based business of the case 
company. 
 
The Manufacturing Strategy Index (MSI) is modeled based on the multi-criteria priority 
weights of the four main competitive priorities Quality (Q), Cost (C), Time (T), and Flexi-
bility (F). These are determined by using the AHP method described in Chapter 3.3 and 
presented in a function as 𝑀𝑆𝐼 =  𝑓𝑀𝑆𝐼(𝑄, 𝐶, 𝑇, 𝐹) (Takala et al., 2012). After the priority 
weights are determined, the normalized weights of the main competitive priorities are 

















   (16) 
 
In the next step, the equations for the MSI of operational competitiveness in each group 




• MSI model for Prospector group: 
When Q% is more than 43%, the company focuses on quality and belongs to the 
Prospector group. Thus, the factor is weighted by taking 1/3 of power to Q%. The 
principle of this group is that the smaller F%, the better and bigger are Q%, T%, 
and C% (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
MSIP = 1 − (1 − 𝑄%
1
3) (1 − 0.9 ∗ 𝑇%)(1 − 0.9 ∗ 𝐶%) ∗ 𝐹%1/3  (17) 
 
• MSI model for Analyzer group: 
The Analyzers focus on F% and therefore balance Q%, T%, and C%, which are 
between 23-43% (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
MSI𝐴 = 1 − (1 − 𝐹%) [
[𝐴𝐵𝑆[0.95 ∗ 𝑄% − 0.285)
∗ (0.95 ∗ 𝑇% − 0.285)
∗ (0.95 ∗ 𝐶% − 0.285)]]
]
1/3
   (18) 
 
• MSI model for Defender group: 
When C% is more than 43%, the company focuses on cost and belongs to the 
Defender group. Defenders try to be cost leaders. Thus, the factor is weighted by 
taking 1/3 of power to C%. The principle of this group is that the smaller F%, the 
better and more significant C%, T%, and Q% (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
MSI𝐷 = 1 − (1 − 𝐶%
1
3) (1 − 0.9 ∗ 𝑇%)(1 − 0.9 ∗ 𝐶%) ∗ 𝐹%  (19) 
 
The results of the MSI can be shown in a triangle, as illustrated in Figure 6. It presents 
the operations strategy of an organization belonging to the Prospector group, where 
quality is in focus. The closer the value is to 1, the more significant are the characteristics 





Figure 6. Manufacturing Strategy Index 
 
These models have been tested in the context of studying global manufacturing strate-
gies (GMSS) in approximately 100 deep case company studies in around ten countries all 
over the world (Takala et al., 2012). 
 
Finally, the MSI is used to calculate the SCA. The SCA value indicates how well the re-
source allocation supports the company’s operations strategy and is, therefore, a risk 
measurement tool, which estimates its functionality. The closer the SCA value is to 1, the 
more consistent are the resource allocation and the operations strategy of the company. 
There are three methods to calculate the SCA: MAPE, RMSE, and MAD (Takala, Koskinen, 
et al., 2013, pp. 49-50). 
 
• MAPE (absolute percentage error) 
This is a statistical measure to predict the accuracy of a forecasting method 
(Heimonen, 2017, p. 42). 
 
MAPE = 𝑆𝐶𝐴 = 1 − ∑ |
𝐵𝑆−𝐵𝑅
𝐵𝑆
|𝛼𝛽𝛾    (20) 
 
where B refers to the angle (Prospector (β) -, Analyzer (γ)- or Defender (α) an-
gle) in radians, S to the MSI (Operations Strategy), and R to S&R resource alloca-
tion (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 69). The strategy, how much of which 
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resource in which ratio is put into operation, depends on the angle (Takala, Liu, 
et al., 2013, p. 1242). 
 
• RMSE (root means squared error) 
RMSE is frequently used to measure the differences between values (sample and 
population values) predicted by a model or an estimator compared to the values 
observed (Heimonen, 2017, p. 42). 
 





𝛼𝛽𝛾    (21) 
 
• MAD (maximum deviation) 
MAD is the average distance of each data value from the mean (Heimonen, 2017, 
p. 42). 
 





|   (22) 
 
The SCA is a value between 0 and 1. If the SCA is 0.97 or greater, the value is high, and 
therefore the resource allocation supports the company’s operations strategy well. Val-
ues between 0.90 and 0.97 are medium-high, and values below 0.90 are low (Takala et 
al., 2014, p. 72). 
 
 
3.6 Knowledge and Technology (K/T)  
The Knowledge and Technology (K/T) model allows us to examine the problem of cost 
overrun from the perspective of the technologies used in the operations of projects. How 





3.6.1 Knowledge and Technology Model (K/T) 
The technologies applied in a company can be situated in a technology pyramid. The 
technologies can be divided into basic-, core-, and spearhead technology. Thereby, it is 
possible to get a snapshot of the current technological situation of a company. Basic 
technology illustrates the crucial know-how on which the products and the business are 
based. They are essential to the business. Core technologies represent the differentiative 
and sophisticated know-how, which aim to give the company a competitive advantage. 
The spearhead technologies illustrate the future areas of know-how and are, therefore, 
the key factors to future markets and businesses. They are essential for success in the 
future (Tuominen et al., 2004, p. 10). For example, in the automotive industry, a car’s 
engine would be basic technology. It is an essential part of a vehicle. Environmental re-
sponsibility is the core technology, as it can achieve a competitive advantage in the pre-
sent. The self-driving car is spearhead technology, as it could be an exciting business 
opportunity in the future (Heimonen, 2017, pp. 25-26). The objective is to locate the 
type of technology (basic, core, or spearhead), which causes the highest amount of un-
certainty for the case company. This procedure allows them to take measures by invest-
ing in it to reduce the risk and therefore sustain competitive advantage and success in 
the market (Tilabi et al., 2019, p. 133). 
 
The sectors of the technology pyramid can be linked to the technology life cycle, as can 





Figure 7. The linkage between the technology life cycle and technology pyramid 
(Tuominen et al., 2004, p. 10). 
 
When a new product or service is launched, this is closely connected to spearhead tech-
nology. In the launching phase, the manufacturing costs are high. In the growth phase, 
the new product or service has proven itself to be able to make a difference. The pro-
duction processes are optimized in a way that the product can be produced economically. 
In this phase, both product and process development are at an optimal level, and core 
technology is dominating. The maturity phase supersedes the growth phase. In the ma-
turity phase, neither the product nor the processes can be developed much further. This 
phase is related to basic technology (Tilabi et al., 2019, pp. 138-139). In the technology 
life cycle, the y-axis stands for the growing technology performance or the cumulative 
adoption of technology. The willingness of customers to pay for better technology per-
formance sinks once the performance has reached an acceptable level. When the tech-
nology performance still increases, customers might not be ready to pay the same price 
premium for it as earlier in the curve. The closer a product or service gets to the maturity 
phase, the more important it gets to present a balanced offer between price and tech-
nology performance. Once the maturity phase is reached, a new disruptive technology 
might eventually emerge and replace the old one. This evolution marks the beginning of 
a new technology life cycle (Adner, 2004, as cited in Taylor & Taylor, 2012, p. 545). To 
sustain its position in the market in the maturity phase, a company should lay the focus 
on reducing the production costs, on newly invented products, and on innovative tech-




To determine the technology share for each performance attribute, a K/T section is 
added to the S&R questionnaire. The respondent must divide the technologies used for 
every performance attribute on a percentage basis in basic-, core-, and spearhead tech-
nology. The total share of technology used must equal 100% (Takala & Tilabi, 2010, p. 3). 
The K/T part of the questionnaire is presented in Table 3. 
 




As a first step, the K/T-Data can be analyzed by comparing the (B)CFI values to the (B)CFI 
K/T values. It shows the resource allocation from the K/T perspective. The calculation of 
the (B)CFI K/T values can be seen in Table 4. First, the color of the performance attribute 
must be taken into consideration and, after that, its dominating technology. A technol-
ogy is dominating when its average value is more than 43%. If all technology levels are 
less than 43%, the one with the highest value is dominating (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 
2013, p. 48). 
 
Table 4. Technology Rankings: General formulas (Takala, Koskinen, et al., 2013, p. 48). 
 
 
The uncertainty regarding each type of technology is calculated by the coefficient of var-
iance (CV) (Takala & Tilabi, 2010, p. 4). The calculation is based on the assumption that 






Technology share of performance attribute
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the difference in the opinions of the respondents on the technology shares is the primary 
source of uncertainty and risk (Tilabi et al., 2019, p. 133). 
 
𝐶𝑉𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑖𝑐
   (23) 
𝐶𝑉𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑒
    (24) 
𝐶𝑉𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑 =  
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑
𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑
   (25) 
 
More precisely, Formulas 23-25 show the level of deviation among the respondents’ an-
swers (Takala & Tilabi, 2010, p. 4). If there is a deviation, there are different understand-
ings of how technology must be used to succeed. The deviation can be interpreted as 
the uncertainty of how to use technology. The uncertainty must be reduced as much as 
possible. 
 
As a next step, the variability coefficient (VarC) is calculated, which takes the four com-
ponents of the RAL model into account (Takala et al., 2016, p. 847): 
 





   (26) 
 
where C1 represents the RAL component Quality, C2 Cost, C3 Time, and C4 Flexibility. 
 
The total amount of risk of technology is calculated with the following formula (Takala 
et al., 2016, p. 847): 
 
𝐾/𝑇 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 =  √∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑖
2
𝑖=𝑐1,𝑐2,𝑐3,𝑐4    (27) 
 
It shows how much the competitiveness of the company falls if the K/T risk materializes 




The idea of K/T is that high technology risk levels can compromise the success of a pro-
ject and therefore lead to cost overrun. Therefore, ways must be found to lower the 
technology risk as much as possible. 
 
 
3.6.2 Sand Cone Model 
The Sand Cone model of cumulative performance has been developed by Ferdows and 
De Meyer (1990) and has been a lasting and popular feature of operations strategy for 
many years (Bortolotti et al., 2015, p. 228). It is a model to describe phenomena or con-
cepts that have some multi-focused, multidimensional, or hierarchical aspects. The per-
formance elements of the studied objects form a “sand cone” (Takala et al., 2006, p. 338). 
According to the model, the best firms seek to improve performance elements in a se-
quence. Previous performance elements must be improved before developing the next 
ones. In the sand cone of Bortolotti et al. (2015) illustrated in Figure 8, the performance 
elements are Quality, Delivery, Flexibility, and Cost. 
 
 
Figure 8. Sand Cone model of cumulative performance (Bortolotti et al., 2015, p. 229). 
 
The quality performance is the foundation of the sand cone. The delivery performance, 
which equals time in the RAL concept, is built upon this foundation. As the delivery per-
formance is developed, the quality foundation expands, and the second layer of the sand 
cone is made. Flexibility performance is built on the foundation of quality- and delivery 
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performance. Cost performance creates the peak of the sand cone and, in turn, expands 
the foundation of quality-, delivery, and flexibility performance (Bortolotti et al., 2015, 
p. 228). Cost efficiency, which is on the top of the sand cone, is the goal. It is the most 
visible layer when examining a company. But according to the model, cost efficiency can 
only be reached when a stable structure consisting of quality, delivery, and flexibility is 
built first. Cost efficiency itself has only a small influence on the structural stability of the 
sand cone, which means that cost-saving measures are not the primary way by which 
cost efficiency is accomplished. In general, one can say that the elements on the bottom 
of the hierarchical structure are internally crucial for the organization. The elements on 
the top of the sand cone are usually not so internally critical. They are instead the results 
of the performance of the internal elements (Takala et al., 2006, pp. 338-339). 
 
A strength of the sand cone is that it can be used for many purposes and with many 
different performance elements (Takala et al., 2016, p. 847). In this thesis, the four com-
ponents, Quality, Cost, Time, and Flexibility of the RAL model, are used as performance 
elements and inserted into the sand cone. The components are inserted into the sand 
cone based on the ranking, which was achieved by the AHP method. The first level is the 
foundation of the sand cone. It is composed of the components to which the most sig-
nificant importance was given. The first level should have 2/3 of the total weight of the 
components. The higher levels are composed of the components, which are ranked to 
have a lower level of relative importance. They have 1/3 of the total weight (Takala et al., 
2006, p. 340). In Figure 9, C1-C4 stand for the criteria, which were weighted by the AHP 
method. The criteria were inserted in three different sand cones, one for each depart-
ment of the example company. As a next step, all VarC calculated with Formula 26 are 
inserted into the sand cone. They represent the uncertainty connected to K/T, that can 
cause collapses in the layers of the sand cone. A risk of over 100% questions the whole 
evaluation based on the criteria. The uncertainty is presented as the dark grey area in 
the layers of the sand cone in Figure 9. Finally, the K/T risk, which is calculated with For-
mula 27, is presented right to the sand cone. It represents how much the competitive-
ness of each department falls if the K/T risk materializes (Takala et al., 2016, p. 847). This 
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additional triangle also enables us to compare different departments or projects to each 
other, as it shows the overall picture (Zucchetti, 2016, p. 44). 
 
 




4 Empirical Research 
This chapter presents the empirical data collection with subsequent data analysis. It 
starts by describing the research process, followed by the data analysis. The data are 
analyzed separately for each project before comparing the projects to each other. For 
the study, the methods presented in Chapter 3 are adapted. 
 
 
4.1 Research process 
The research process describes how the empirical data was collected. It is presented how 
the questionnaire was created, who responded to it, how the received answers were 




Two questionnaires were created for data collection: The S&R Questionnaire and the 
AHP Questionnaire. Both were sent to the respondents as Microsoft Excel files. 
 
The S&R method has the advantage that it is highly customizable and therefore allows 
the design of a questionnaire perfectly shaped to the research question. For this ques-
tionnaire, 46 performance attributes were created, which reflect the main operations 
within the engineering process and the site management process of the case company. 
The possible technical explanations for cost overrun introduced in Chapter 2.2.1 were 
considered while creating the performance attributes. Furthermore, the internal guide-
lines and advice of experts of the case company supported the creation. The analysis 
indicates the critical attributes, which contribute to cost overrun in the projects. It is 
essential to take note that the influence of the sales process on the engineering process 
and site management process is not included and can, therefore, not be analyzed, as 
most respondents can’t assess it. 
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The performance attributes and the respective allocation to the RAL-dimensions are pre-
sented in Table 5. The attributes are divided into the categories “Supporting Processes”, 
“Engineering and Validation Process”, “Site Management Process”, and “Soft factors”. 
The Supporting Processes are furthermore divided into the Startup-, Execution-, and 
Closeout phase of the project. The Engineering and Validation Process and the Site Man-
agement Process are divided into Automation- and Electrical work, as these two catego-
ries might produce very different results. The RAL dimensions are allocated to the per-
formance attributes, which are most affected by it. For instance, Time is the essential 
RAL component for Project scheduling. This procedure allows us to determine the stra-
tegic type of the respective project, which can be compared to the strategic type of the 
case company. Eighteen performance attributes were allocated to Quality, 12 attributes 









1 Project scheduling ← Time
2 Establishing of project team ← Quality
3 Resource Management ← Flexibility
4 Financial & Cost Management ← Cost
5 Communications Management ← Quality
6 Procurement & Contractor Management ← Cost
7 Change Management ← Cost
8 Risk & Opportunity Management ← Cost
9 Schedule Management ← Time
10 HSE Management ← Cost
11 Quality Management ← Quality
12 Requirement Management ← Quality
13 Decision-making ← Time
14 Information Management ← Time
15 Knowledge Management ← Quality
16 Technology Management ← Quality
Closeout 17 Project acceptance, take-over and closeout ← Cost
Engineering and Validation Process
18 Resource Management ← Flexibility
19 Conceptual Design ← Cost
20 Basic Design ← Quality
21 Detailed Design ← Quality
22 Manufacturing ← Time
23 Off-site Validation ← Quality
24 Resource Management ← Flexibility
25 Conceptual Design ← Cost
26 Basic Design ← Quality
27 Detailed Design ← Quality
28 Manufacturing ← Time
29 Off-site Validation ← Quality
Site Management Process
30 Resource Management ← Flexibility
31 Site Establishment and Mobilization ← Time
32 Construction and Installation ← Time
33 Commissioning ← Quality
34 Construction and Installation ← Time
35 Commissioning ← Quality
36 Construction and Installation ← Time
37 Commissioning ← Quality
38 Demobilization ← Cost
Soft factors
39 Professional relationship ← Flexibility
40 Know-How / Experience ← Cost
41 Knowledge ← Quality
42 Competence ← Cost
43 Engagement ← Quality
44 Innovation ← Cost
45 Teamwork ← Time










The questionnaire is identical for all projects, which ensures comparability between the 
projects. However, some performance attributes are not necessarily feasible in every 
project, and some respondents are not able to answer all performance attributes, as 
they were not involved in the whole process. In such cases, the respective performance 
attributes can be left empty. Instructions and comments were added into the Excel ques-
tionnaire file to ensure that all respondents knew what to do, and all performance at-
tributes are understood in the right way. 
 
There are different sections to assess, as presented in Table 2. First, the respondents 
must determine the expectations for each performance attribute. They must therefore 
evaluate how well the attribute at least must perform in future projects (next three 
years) that the project stays on budget, and thus no cost overrun occurs. The scale goes 
from 1, which means low expectation, to 10, which means high expectation. Five is de-
fined to be “normal expectation”, which means that the attribute must not perform ex-
ceptionally well but is not allowed to perform poorly for a good overall performance of 
the company. 
 
Next, the experiences for each performance attribute must be assessed, which means 
how the performance (success) of each attribute was in the project on the same scale 
with 1 meaning worst possible outcome and 10 meaning best possible outcome. Five 
means that the outcome (success) of the attribute was neither exceptionally good nor 
bad. 
 
In the “Direction of Development” section, the respondents must assess the perfor-
mance of the attribute compared to previous projects, which were two to five years be-
fore. This section shows a trend, how the performance has developed from past projects 
to the assessed project. Together with the “Expectation” and “Experience” section, the 
CFIs can be calculated. This approach provides a snapshot of the situation when the ex-
amined project was implemented. As most respondents are engineers, which are usually 
not involved in the strategic development of the case company, they can’t assess the 
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future development of a performance attribute. Therefore, there is no such section. But 
thanks to their experience, they can evaluate the trend from past projects to the as-
sessed project. 
 
The “Compared with competitors” section, which is often a part of the questionnaire 
(e.g., in Tilabi et al. (2019)), was left away because the respondents are not necessarily 
able to compare the case company to its competitors. Moreover, the specific solutions 
designed for the clients make comparison difficult. 
 
The K/T part is integrated into the same questionnaire. The same performance attributes 
must be divided into the shares of basic-, core-, and spearhead technology required for 
their completion. Explanations and company-specific examples are placed in the ques-
tionnaire file to simplify the allocation of technology shares for the respondents. The 
technology examples were verified with experts from the case company. 
 
The AHP questionnaire was created based on the Excel template created by Goepel 
(2013). It allows a simple pairwise comparison of the RAL dimensions Quality, Cost, Time, 
and Flexibility and ensures consistency of the answers. The questionnaire was set in a 
way that the answer is considered valid and reliable if the inconsistency ratio (ICR) is less 
than 0.30 (Takala, Shylina, et al., 2013, p. 68). This questionnaire is to determine the 
relative importance of the RAL dimensions and therefore choose the operations strategy 




Before the questionnaire was sent to the respondents, an acid-test was conducted. One 
expert in the case company filled out the S&R and AHP questionnaires. The results were 
reviewed together. This proceeding led to some adaptions, as ambiguities were removed. 
Overall, the performance attributes in the questionnaire covered all the essential oper-




The respondents of the S&R questionnaire were all experts actively involved in the Engi-
neering Process, or Site Management Process of the examined projects, or both. The 
questionnaire was sent to all employees who worked in the concerned projects long 
enough to be able to assess some or all the performance attributes. The respondents 
are engineers, site managers, and project managers of the case company. By coincidence, 
no respondents have been working in more than one of the examined projects. 
 
The AHP questionnaire was sent to four respondents who are qualified to rank the com-
petitive priorities of the case company. 
 
The questionnaires were sent by e-mail. Additional instructions were given online if re-
quested. It was not possible to meet the respondents in person due to the prevailing 
Covid-19 situation, which led to further challenges in the data collection process. Getting 
enough answers was challenging and time-consuming. The potential respondents were 
occupied with many ongoing projects. 
 
 
4.1.4 Market-based validation and additional data collection 
Once the data is analyzed, the findings require validation from the respondents. Moreo-
ver, further feedback is needed to uncover the root causes of critical performance attrib-
utes and technological uncertainty. Therefore, the so-called Weak Market Test (WMT) 
was used to get the respondent’s opinions on the results. The WMT is passed if the re-
spondents accept the results and thus would be willing to apply them in their actual 
decision making (Kasanen et al., 1993, p. 253). Therefore, some respondents were se-
lected for an additional interview. The results were compared to their opinions, and fur-
ther background to the results was gathered. The interviews took place online, as the 




4.2 Data analysis 
This chapter analyses the data from the questionnaires. In the first step, the data from 
the AHP questionnaire is analyzed. Second, Project 1, Project 2, and Project 3 are ana-
lyzed separately. Lastly, the analyses of the three projects are compared to each other. 
All analyses are directly followed by the marked-based validation and additional data 
collection from interviews.  
 
For the S&R questionnaires of Project 1, Project 2, and Project 3, answers were received 
from a total of 15 respondents. The detailed division of responses received can be seen 




Table 6. Number of answers received 
 
 
The number of answers per attribute varies from 2-5. There are multiple reasons for this. 
Not all the respondents could assess all the performance attributes, as they were work-
ing in the project for a short time or only for a limited task. Sometimes there were not 
ATTRIBUTES
Project Management Process S&R K/T S&R K/T S&R K/T
1 Project scheduling 4 4 2 2 3 3
2 Establishing of project team 4 4 2 2 3 3
3 Resource Management 5 5 3 3 3 3
4 Financial & Cost Management 3 4 3 3 3 3
5 Communications Management 3 4 3 3 3 3
6 Procurement & Contractor Management 3 4 3 3 3 2
7 Change Management 4 4 3 3 3 3
8 Risk & Opportunity Management 3 4 3 3 3 3
9 Schedule Management 4 5 3 3 3 3
10 HSE Management 3 4 3 3 3 3
11 Quality Management 4 4 3 3 3 3
12 Requirement Management 4 4 3 3 3 3
13 Decision-making 4 4 3 3 3 3
14 Information Management 4 4 3 3 3 3
15 Knowledge Management 4 4 3 3 3 3
16 Technology Management 4 4 3 3 3 3
Closeout 17 Project acceptance, take-over and closeout 3 4 3 3 3 2
Engineering and Validation Process
18 Resource Management 3 4 3 3 3 3
19 Conceptual Design 2 3 3 3 3 3
20 Basic Design 3 4 3 3 3 3
21 Detailed Design 3 4 3 3 3 3
22 Manufacturing 3 4 3 3 3 3
23 Off-site Validation 3 4 3 3 3 3
24 Resource Management 5 5 3 3 3 3
25 Conceptual Design 2 3 3 3 3 3
26 Basic Design 3 4 3 3 3 3
27 Detailed Design 5 5 3 3 3 3
28 Manufacturing 3 4 3 3 3 3
29 Off-site Validation 3 4 3 3 3 3
Site Management Process
30 Resource Management 4 4 5 4 3 3
31 Site Establishment and Mobilization 3 4 5 4 3 3
32 Construction and Installation 3 4 4 4 3 3
33 Commissioning 4 4 4 4 3 3
34 Construction and Installation 3 4 4 3 3 3
35 Commissioning 4 4 4 3 3 3
36 Construction and Installation 3 4 5 4 3 3
37 Commissioning 4 4 5 4 3 3
38 Demobilization 3 4 4 3 3 3
Soft factors
39 Professional relationship 5 4 4 3 3 3
40 Know-How / Experience 5 4 4 3 3 3
41 Knowledge 5 4 4 3 3 3
42 Competence 5 4 4 3 3 3
43 Engagement 5 4 4 3 3 3
44 Innovation 5 4 4 3 3 3
45 Teamwork 5 4 4 3 3 3
46 Organizational culture 4 4 4 3 3 3
Project 1 Project 2 Project 3










more respondents working in the project, which would be able to assess the attribute. 
In some cases, a potential respondent couldn’t be reached or was not working for the 
case company anymore. 
 
Microsoft Excel was used to analyze the data, as the software was successfully used for 
other similar studies. When it comes to the S&R analysis, the NSCFI was used. It is the 
most advanced of the presented indexes and is suited for a relatively small number of 
respondents, as explained in Chapter 3.4. 
 
 
4.2.1 AHP Analysis 
The result of the AHP questionnaire looks as follows: 
 
 
Figure 10. Competitive priorities of the case company. 
 
Figure 10 presents the competitive priorities of the case company. The respondents, on 
average, give Quality he most weight in the projects of the case company with 33,7%. 
Cost is the second most crucial component with 30,5%. Next follows Time with 28,7%. 
Flexibility with 7,2% plays the smallest role, according to the respondents. The opinions 
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of the respondents varied considerably regarding the weights of Quality, Cost, and Time. 
There only was unanimity regarding Flexibility, which all respondents considered as the 




Figure 11. Operations strategy of the case company based on MSI. 
 
The operations strategy based on MSI can be seen in Figure 11. It is calculated with For-
mula 18. The strategy type of the case company tends to be an Analyzer. It is a combina-
tion of the Defender and Prospector types where Quality, Cost, and Time are balanced. 
An Analyzer tries to minimize risk while maximizing the opportunity for profit. This strat-
egy type, therefore, combines the strengths of both the Defender and the Prospector. 
The main share of the revenue is generated by a relatively stable set of products and 
customers, which is a Defender characteristic. The risks of the Analyzer are both ineffi-
ciency and ineffectiveness if the necessary balance between stability and flexibility can’t 
be kept (Miles et al., 1978, pp. 553-557). The closer descriptions of the strategy types 







Respondent 16 accepts the AHP results. The description for the Analyzer matches the 
business of the case company. It fits surprisingly well. This segment of the case company 
is not always about the newest technologies, and risks must be minimized. 
 
 
4.2.2 Project 1 
 
Next, the answers received from the questionnaire for Project 1 are analyzed. 
 
Sense and Respond Analysis 
 




Figure 12. Comparison of the average of expectation vs. the average of experiences in 
Project 1. 
 
Figure 12 shows that the expectation towards all attributes is high, from seven upwards. 
All attributes must therefore perform well, that cost overruns can be avoided. The 
71 
 
average of experiences is below the average for the expectation for all performance at-
tributes. Thus, all performance attributes have room for improvement. In some cases, 
the gap between expectations and experiences is vast, such as for attributes 3, 7, 8, 9, 
25, and 30. 
 
 
Figure 13. Resource allocation in Project 1 based on NSCFI. 
 
A closer look is required to locate the performance attributes which contributed most to 
the cost overrun. Figure 13 illustrates the resource allocation in Project 1 based on NSCFI. 
The average resource level is at 0,021, with the upper bound at 0,029 and the lower 
bound at 0,015 for balanced resource allocations, marked by the black dashed lines. All 
NSCFI values added up would give 1 (or 100%). When a performance attribute is bal-
anced (green) or over-resourced (yellow), this doesn’t necessarily mean that it per-
formed well. It performed just close to the average resource level (green) or clearly over 
average (yellow), and therefore accounted less to the cost overrun than a critical perfor-




Table 7. Critical performance attributes of Project 1 
 
 
There are many critical performance attributes in Project 1, as the red bars in Figure 13 
show. Table 6 lists all these critical attributes, which were mainly responsible for the cost 
overrun. Almost half of the attributes in the Supporting Processes are critical. Moreover, 
half of the attributes in the Engineering Process are critical. Notable is that all attributes 
related to Resource Management are critical. Resource Management is critical as a Sup-
porting Process (no. 7), in the Engineering Process both in the Automation- (no. 18) and 
Electrical category (no. 24) and the Site Management Process (no. 30) and therefore 
seemed to be a big problem. The fact that Change Management, Risk & Opportunity 
Management, Schedule Management, Requirement Management, and Decision-making 
are all critical indicates that it was tough to cope with the challenges encountered in the 
project. In the Site Management Process, Commissioning (no. 33) was critical. 
 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage Analysis 
 
The results of the SCA analysis indicate how well the resource allocation based on the 
NSCFI values support the operations strategy of the case company. 
 
Process Phase Number Description
Startup 1 Project scheduling
3 Resource Management
4 Financial & Cost Management
7 Change Management




















Table 8. NSCFI values per RAL component of Project 1. 
 
 
When summing up all NSCFI values of the allocated attributes, the results are as in Table 
8. These are used to calculate the strategy type according to Project 1. 
 
 
Figure 14. Operations strategy in Project 1 based on NSCFI values. 
 
The strategy type of the case company, according to NSCFI in Project 1, tends to be An-
alyzer, as can be seen in Figure 14. This result corresponds with the strategy type of the 
case company, which tends to be Analyzer as well. 
 
Table 9. SCA values of Project 1. 
 
 
The resource allocation in the project is compared to the operations strategy of the case 
company by calculating the SCA values. The results are as in Table 9. MAPE, RMSE, and 
Dimension Quality Cost Time Flexibility
NSCFI 187,88 140,16 129,36 24,34
Technique MAPE RMSE MAD
NSCFI 0,99 1,00 1,00
NSCFI T/K 0,99 0,99 0,99
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MAD are very close to 1, or even 1, which means the resource allocation, according to 
NSCFI, is almost entirely supporting the operations strategy of the case company. The 
values for NSCFI T/K are also very close to 1. The resource allocation in Project 1 is, there-
fore, very consistent with the operations strategy of the case company. 
 
Knowledge and Technology Analysis 
 
This section concentrates on the results from the K/T part of the questionnaire. 
 
 
Figure 15. Technology shares in Project 1. 
 
The average technology shares, according to the respondents in Project 1, can be seen 
in Figure 15. Striking is the dominance of basic technology for all performance attributes. 
The share of spearhead technology is almost negligible, which means that almost no 
innovative technologies, which illustrate future areas of know-how, were used. Basic 
technologies are commonly used and should, therefore, be familiar to the employees. 





Figure 16. K/T uncertainty (CV) by performance attribute in Project 1. 
 
Figure 16 shows that uncertainty (CV) is highest for attributes no. 1-4 in the Supporting 
Processes, no. 18-28 in the Engineering Process, and no. 33, 35, and 37 in the Site Man-
agement Process. For attributes no. 43-46, there is no uncertainty at all. In the Site Man-
agement Process, the critical attributes (30, 33, 35, 37) have higher uncertainty than the 
other attributes of the same process. 
 
 
Figure 17. CV of K/T in Project 1. 
 
Most uncertainty is related to core technology, as can be seen in Figure 17. The second 
most uncertainty is related to spearhead technology. This figure shows that the 
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respondents disagree on the technology shares, which could indicate uncertainty in the 
use of the technologies. As a result, the best performance can’t be achieved. 
 
 
Figure 18. K/T risk by technology in Project 1. 
 
Figure 18 shows the K/T risk. Most risk is related to core technology, followed by spear-
head technology. There is only a little risk related to basic technology, which is good, as 
the most significant share of technology is basic technology. 
 
 




Figure 19 presents the K/T risk related to the RAL components, calculated with Formulas 
26 and 27. The most significant risk is related to Quality, with 62%. Thus, the competi-
tiveness of the project might have fallen by up to 62% because of performance attributes 
linked to Quality. At this moment, one must consider that many attributes were con-




Figure 20. K/T uncertainty of Project 1. 
 
Figure 20 presents the sand cone of Project 1. C1 stands Quality, C2 stands Cost, C3 stands 
for Time, and C4 stands for Flexibility. The absolute risk is 85%, which means the total 
competitiveness of Project 1 has fallen up to 85% if the K/T risk materialized. This risk 
undoubtedly contributed to the cost overrun. 
 
Market-based validation and additional data collection 
 
The results were presented to Respondent 1. The respondent confirms that the critical 
attributes are correct and sees Resource Management (no. 3, 18, 24, 30) as the root 
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cause for the cost overrun. The team members changed a lot, and therefore the same 
learning curve had to be gone through many times. Respondent 6 was part of the project 
team for the commissioning. Relating to Resource Management (no. 3, 18, 24, 30), the 
respondent sees the main problem in the fact that the whole project team except for 
the project manager changed during the project. The employees from the beginning of 
the Engineering Process were not involved in the final stage of the project. As a result, 
the team during commissioning didn’t know what was agreed on earlier in the project. 
This circumstance caused a loss of knowledge and information. Consequently, many 
things were done multiple times. The key persons changed, too. For instance, there were 
three different leaders appointed for the site in different stages of the project. Further-
more, the project team in the original composition at the beginning of the project had 
experience from similar projects in other countries, but not from the country where this 
project was implemented. The respondent has understood that in this particular country, 
where the project was implemented, the project team has to work more autonomous to 
stay on schedule and doesn’t get that much support from the customer’s consultant in 
setting strict deadlines and leading the planning. Respondent 1 suggests nominating lead 
engineers who accompany the whole project and overlook the technical part. There 
should be an automation lead and an electrical lead. A project manager has several on-
going projects at the same time and, therefore, usually doesn’t have the time to manage 
all technical aspects of the project. It moreover requires a lot of time to immerse oneself 
in all the technical aspects. Respondent 16 states that there were competent employees 
in this project. However, because of time-scheduling and other reasons, there were fi-
nally many employees working in the project, which made it messy. In the beginning, 
there was a team that has worked successfully together before. Therefore the starting 
position was good. However, this changed at some point, and it was not the initial team 
anymore. Moreover, there was one new employee who started working in this project 
in an important role. This employee left the case company again in the middle of the 
project. The employee had to be replaced by somebody else, which was challenging. This 
circumstance can be seen in the performance of the commissioning (no. 33, 35, 37). The 
respondent depicts that the main challenge is to have the right employees available for 
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the suited projects. Employees sometimes must be changed in the middle of projects 
even though it is not a good solution. It is not possible to get entirely rid of that. Maybe 
it would be good to concentrate on minimizing the impact of changing personnel re-
sources, for example, by defined routines. The employee, who came newly to Project 1, 
didn’t have the case company’s ways of working. There should be somebody, be it a lead 
engineer or the project manager, who pulls strings and directs the project technologi-
cally and according to the client’s requirements. The quality suffers when the employees 
are changing a lot. It should be an objective that Resource Management goes well in all 
projects. Respondent 16 sees an additional reason for the criticality of Requirement 
Management. The team realized in the final stage of the project that one component 
was completely missing. A new person started planning it in a rush. The startup phase 
with performance attributes no. 1 (Project Scheduling) and no. 2 (Establishing of project 
team) were critical according to Respondent 1 because the contract was received late, 
and the planned team members were occupied in other projects. There were many pro-
jects ongoing at that time, and the schedule was tight. 
 
Respondent 1 explains the criticality of Change Management (no. 7), Risk & Opportunity 
Management (no. 8), Requirement Management (no. 12), and Decision-making (no. 13) 
with a very demanding client (no. 39, Professional relationship, was a balanced attribute 
though, but experiences were on average 1,5 points lower than expectations). The ne-
gotiations were time-consuming, as there were some strong personalities on the cus-
tomer’s side. Changes were challenging to realize. Respondent 6 saw problems in coop-
eration with the client, too. The client had a consultant who could be difficult and de-
manding. The consultant had written a project description, from which no deviation was 
tolerated. The project description was furthermore written in a way that the case com-
pany had a lot of responsibilities and liabilities. The case company might not have been 
sufficiently aware of this in the early stage of the project. Respondent 1 explains the 
criticality of the Conceptual design (no. 19, no. 25) also by this project description. For 
Respondent 4, Conceptual Design was a completely new term when filling out the 
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questionnaire. Furthermore, the respondent has never seen the quality documentation, 
where the Engineering Process is described and guesses that many others have neither. 
 
According to Respondent 6, it would have been good to visit the site more often during 
planning in the Engineering Process. At the site, a lot of changes had to be made to de-
livered components. A lot of additional parts were needed. Moreover, the sub-contrac-
tor in charge of the installations encountered some challenges as the case companies’ 
new systems had to be connected to the existing old systems, whose documentations 
were incomplete in many sections. Respondent 1 confirms that there was additional 
work at the site, as new components had to be connected to the old system. This cir-
cumstance might have compromised Commissioning (no. 33, 35, 37). Furthermore, Re-
spondent 3, who joined the project for the commissioning, reported communication 
problems between the project team and the sub-contractor in the time before the re-
spondent was at the site. Moreover, Respondent 6 would have wished for more support 
from the management in the commissioning phase, as the project team had to decide 
on matters themselves at the site. A lack of support in this stage certainly compromised 
the attribute Decision-making (no. 13). Furthermore, Respondent 6 states that inept re-
quirements from the client shouldn’t have been accepted that easily. 
 
When it comes to the scope of the project and the technologies used, the project was 
ordinary, according to Respondent 6. There shouldn’t have been anything new or unique, 
which the technology shares in Figure 15 confirm. Respondent 1 explains that the scope 






4.2.3 Project 2 
This section concentrates on the results of the questionnaire for Project 2. 
 
Sense and Respond Analysis 
 
 
Figure 21. Comparison of the average of expectation vs. the average of experiences in 
Project 2. 
 
Figure 21 compares the average of expectation to the average of experiences. The ex-
pectations in Project 2 are between 4,3 and 9,3. The respondents have the lowest ex-
pectation towards Change Management (no. 7), HSE Management (no. 10), and Demo-
bilization (no. 38). The respondents, in turn, have very high expectations (9 and more) 
towards Project scheduling (no. 1), Detailed Design Automation (no. 21), Off-site Valida-
tion (no. 23), Resource Management Electrical (no. 24), and Basic Design Electrical (no. 
26). In the Supporting Processes, there were some performance attributes, which per-





Figure 22. Resource allocation in Project 2 based on NSCFI. 
 
Figure 22 illustrates the resource allocation in Project 2 based on NSCFI. The average 
resource level is at 0,021, with the upper bound at 0,029 and the lower bound at 0,015 
for balanced resource allocations. The many critical performance attributes in the Engi-
neering Process and Site Management Process are standing out. Supporting Processes 
mainly went well. 
 
Table 10. Critical performance attributes of Project 2. 
 
 
Process Phase Number Description
Startup 1 Project scheduling










General 32 Construction and Installation
Automation 34 Construction and Installation
36 Construction and Installation
37 Commissioning
38 Demobilization












The critical performance attributes are presented in Table 10. Resource Management 
(no. 3, 18, 24, 30) is very critical in Project 2. Only no. 3 is narrowly a balanced attribute. 
In the Engineering Process, both in the Automation and Electrical category, the same 
attributes are critical. The critical attributes in the Engineering Process are besides Re-
source Management (no. 18, 24), Basic Design (no. 20, 26), Detailed Design (no. 21, 27), 
and Off-site Validation (no. 23, 29). In the Soft factors, Know-How / Experience (no. 40), 
Competence (no. 42), and Organizational culture (no. 46) are critical. 
 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage Analysis 
 
Table 11. NSCFI values per RAL component of Project 2. 
 
 
The overall NSCFI values per RAL component are presented in Table 11 and are used to 
calculate the strategy type in Project 2. 
 
 
Figure 23. Operations strategy in Project 2 based on NSCFI values. 
 
Dimension Quality Cost Time Flexibility
NSCFI 294,23 261,56 221,65 45,47
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As presented in Figure 23, the strategy type, according to Project 2, tends to be Analyzer. 
The strategy type corresponds with the one of the case company. The operations strat-
egy of the case company was followed well. 
 
Table 12. SCA values of Project 2. 
 
 
The SCA values in Table 12 support this impression. The case company's operations strat-
egy is almost entirely supported by the resource allocation, as the NSCFI values are all 
close to 1. When looking at the NSCFI K/T, the values are only medium-high, as they are 
between 0,90 and 0,97. 
 
Knowledge and Technology Analysis 
 
The results of the K/T part of the questionnaire are presented below. 
 
 
Figure 24. Technology shares in Project 2. 
 
Especially in the Supporting Processes and in the soft factors, basic technology is domi-
nating, as illustrated in Figure 24. In the Engineering Process and the Site Management 
Technique MAPE RMSE MAD
NSCFI 0,98 0,99 0,99
NSCFI T/K 0,95 0,97 0,97
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Process, there are higher shares of core- and spearhead technology. However, basic tech-
nology still accounts for the most significant share, except for attribute no. 35. 
 
 
Figure 25. K/T uncertainty (CV) by performance attribute in Project 2. 
 
Figure 25 shows a broad consensus about the technologies used in the Supporting Pro-
cesses and soft factors. The variance grows in the Engineering Process and Site Manage-
ment Process, where there seems to be much more uncertainty. 
 
 
Figure 26. CV of K/T in Project 2. 
 
The uncertainty (CV), which is presented in Figure 26, is the most prominent related to 




Figure 27. K/T risk by technology in Project 2. 
 
According to Figure 27, core technology also bears the biggest risk, closely followed by 
spearhead technology. The risk connected to basic technology is smaller. 
 
 
Figure 28. Variability coefficients (VarC) of Project 2. 
 
When the variability coefficients are calculated relating to the RAL components, the 
highest risk is related to Quality, as can be seen in Figure 28. All values are clearly under 





Figure 29. K/T uncertainty of Project 2. 
 
Figure 29 presents the sand cone of Project 1. C1 stands Quality, C2 stands Cost, C3 stands 
for Time, and C4 stands for Flexibility. According to the K/T model, the competitiveness 
of Project 3 might have fallen up to 37% if the K/T risk materialized. 
 
Market-based validation and additional data collection 
 
Respondent 9 confirms that the results look correct. The first critical attribute (no. 1, 
Project Scheduling) sticks out. When looking at the whole project from the beginning, 
there would have been a lot of time, and the attribute should not be critical. But as the 
engineers answered the question from their perspective, it looks different. They came 
into the project when it was more urgent. There was almost no contingency included in 
the offer, as it was crucial to get the project awarded. Therefore, the cost overrun could 
easily occur. 
 
Respondent 9 sees the root cause for the cost overrun in Project 2 in the missing per-
sonnel resources and therefore confirms the criticality of Resource Management in 
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performance attributes no. 18 (Engineering Process, Automation), no. 24 (Engineering 
Process, Electrical), and no. 30 (Site Management Process). The project started relatively 
well, but problems started in the Basic Design. Own resources were short because of 
many other ongoing projects. Therefore, resources from other units of the case company 
were used both for the Engineering Process and for the Site Management Process. How-
ever, these employees had no experience of this type of project and didn’t speak the 
language of the country where the project site was located. This deficiency led to prob-
lems. Mistakes in the design processes could have been corrected during the Off-site 
Validation or latest during Commissioning. Nonetheless, there were still no additional 
resources made available. Respondent 9 would consider it helpful if there were core 
teams, which are assigned to projects. These would already know each other, know how 
to act and what can be expected of each other. Respondent 7, who was actively involved 
in the project in the Site Management Process, confirms the criticality of Resource Man-
agement by stating that the main problem in this project was that almost the whole 
project team changed when the Site Management Process began. 
 
Respondent 9 confirms the criticality of Communications Management (no. 5) if it was 
related to the project documentation. The problem was that everything went into man-
ufacturing without approval, which was a significant risk. Problems had to be fixed at the 
site. The Engineering Process must go well; otherwise, there is three times more work 
during the Site Management Process. Because of a shortage of time and changing per-
sonnel resources, it was difficult to move the documentation to the employees who 
newly came to the project. Communication, in general, was critical, as there was a lan-
guage barrier. On the client’s side, they were reluctant to speak English, and most em-
ployees of the case company didn’t speak the local language. 
 
Respondent 9 confirms that within the critical attributes, Basic Design (no. 20, no. 26) 
went better than Detailed Design (no. 21, no. 27), which in turn went better than Off-
site Validation (no. 23, no. 29), as the results show. It was in Basic Design when the pro-
ject started to fail. The first two to three months of the project went well. In Construction 
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and Installation (no. 32, no. 34, no. 36), risks were taken, as the sub-contractor was cho-
sen for the first time. 
 
Respondent 16 says that it is precise as the results show that Know-How/Experience 
(no.40) is critical. There were personnel resources used from other units who didn’t have 
the required experience. They were experts but didn’t have the expertise in this segment. 
Respondent 9 thought about the personnel resources, who came from another unit, 
when answering to Organizational Culture (no. 46). They were experienced commission-
ers. But they worked a lot in places where there is a vast cultural difference. There, when 
something doesn’t function, one doesn’t react to it. One is not allowed to make changes 
without permission. Here, the problems are fixed. They didn’t know that hence they 
didn’t intervene. The respondent emphasizes that the cooperation with the client in this 






4.2.4 Project 3 
The questionnaire analysis for Project 3 can be found below. 
 
Sense and Respond Analysis 
 
 
Figure 30. Comparison of the average of expectation vs. the average of experiences in 
Project 3. 
 
Figure 30 compares the average of expectations to the average of experiences. All ex-
pectations are over seven, except for HSE Management (no. 10), which is slightly less. 
This circumstance shows that the respondents have high expectations towards the per-
formance attributes, that the project can stay on budget. The experiences are always 
lower than the expectations, which means there is room for improvement for all attrib-
utes. There are no experiences for attributes no. 31, 32, 36, and 38, as they were not in 





Figure 31. Resource allocation in Project 3 based on NSCFI. 
 
Figure 31 illustrates the resource allocation in Project 3 based on NSCFI. The average 
resource level is at 0,024, with the upper bound at 0,034 and the lower bound at 0,016 
for balanced resource allocations, marked by the black dashed lines. The resource allo-
cation for attributes no. 31, 32, 34, 36, and 38 cannot be calculated, as they were not 
part of the case company’s scope and are therefore not feasible for the cost overrun of 
the case company in this project. The critical resources are presented in Table 13: 
 
Table 13. Critical performance attributes of Project 3. 
 
 
Especially noticeable when examining the critical performance attributes in Table 13 is 
that electrical work seems to be significantly more critical than automation work. In this 
project, four critical attributes are directly linked to electrical work, but none to automa-
tion work. In the category of soft factors, Know-How/Experience (no. 40), Knowledge (no. 





















41), and Competence (no. 42) are all critical. In this project, Resource Management (no. 
30) is only critical in the Site Management Process. 
 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage Analysis 
 
Table 14. NSCFI values per RAL component of Project 3. 
 
 
The NSCFI values per RAL component are calculated in Table 14. They are used to define 
the strategy type of Project 3. 
 
 
Figure 32. Operations strategy in Project 3 based on NSCFI values. 
 
The strategy type of Project 3 has a slight tendency to be Prospector, as can be seen in 
Figure 32. All calculated values are relatively close to each other. 
 
Dimension Quality Cost Time Flexibility
NSCFI 347,52 215,25 116,49 73,79
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Table 15. SCA values of Project 3. 
 
 
The SCA values of Project 3 in Table 15 confirm that the resource allocations don’t sup-
port the operations strategy as well as in Project 1 and Project 2. The values are slightly 
lower, but still medium-high, which means the resource allocation in Project 3 supports 
the operation’s strategy well, too. NSCFI T/K values are slightly lower than the NSCFI val-
ues. 
 
Knowledge and Technology Analysis 
 
 
Figure 33. Technology shares in Project 3. 
 
The technology shares per attribute in Project 3 can be seen in Figure 33. Basic technol-
ogy is dominant for all attributes. There is some spearhead technology, mainly in the 
Engineering Process. 
 
Technique MAPE RMSE MAD
NSCFI 0,95 0,97 0,97




Figure 34. K/T uncertainty (CV) by performance attribute in Project 3. 
 
When the K/T uncertainty is examined separately for every performance attribute, as in 
Figure 34, there is some uncertainty in the division into basic- and core technology for 
all performance attributes. Most uncertainty is in the Engineering Process, as there ad-
ditionally is some uncertainty relating to spearhead technology.  
 
There seems to be a limited correlation between the critical attributes and the T/K un-
certainty by performance attributes. Attributes no. 26, 28, 29 40, 41, and 42 are critical 







Figure 35. CV of K/T in Project 3. 
 
Figure 35 shows the coefficient of variation of K/T. The most significant variation occurs 
relating to core technology, while spearhead- and basic technology have around the 








Figure 36 shows the K/T risk when the RAL components are considered. Most risk is re-




Figure 37. Variability coefficients (VarC) of Project 3. 
 
When examining the variability coefficients in Figure 37, all values are clearly under one 
(<1), which means that the uncertainty levels are relatively low. The most uncertainty is 






Figure 38. K/T uncertainty of Project 3. 
 
Figure 38 shows the situation when the VarC are inserted into the sand cone, where C1 
is Quality, C2 is Cost, C3 is Time, and C4 is Flexibility. According to the K/T model, the 
competitiveness of Project 3 might have fallen up to 40% if the K/T risk materialized. 
 
Market-based validation and additional data collection 
 
Respondent 12 explains that, in general, it is difficult to compare the cost reporting to 
the cost calculation. Only the project manager knows what the reported costs include 
and to which part of the cost calculation it must be compared. In this project, the site 
management was subcontracted and was therefore not relevant for the cost overrun of 
the case company. However, Commissioning was in the responsibility of the case com-
pany. 
 
The project was affected by exogenous static uncertainty. As Respondent 12 reports, the 
whole scope could not be delivered because of sudden political restrictions. As some 
equipment was already explicitly manufactured for this project but could not be sold, 
this led to a cost increase. Nevertheless, there might be a chance that the equipment 
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can be sold at a later point in time, which would reduce the cost overrun. The restrictions 
were unfortunate and could not be prevented through better planning. However, Re-
spondent 12 states that the restrictions weren’t responsible for a substantial share of 
the cost overrun. This circumstance primarily kept the project manager busy. The cost 
overrun mainly occurred because of materials, which were not calculated correctly in 
the sales process and because of more working hours than planned. There was a massive 
workload in the planning process; it was bureaucratic. The Commissioning exceeded the 
original schedule. Much more time was needed than scheduled. There was a lot of trav-
eling, which included flying. The respondent confirms that Schedule Management (at-
tribute no. 9) was critical. However, this was because of reasons independent from the 
case company but still contributed to the cost overrun. The reporting continued, and the 
project still had to be maintained, although there was no progress. The schedule ex-
ceeded already before the restrictions because of a sub-contractor of the client. The 
whole process was bureaucratic, and the acceptance process took a lot of time. Decision-
making (no. 13) was also critical because of bureaucratic procedures and time-consum-
ing communication. What Respondent 12 had in mind when answering to the perfor-
mance attribute Technology Management (no. 16) was the condition monitoring tool, 
with which values were monitored. There was not enough know-how for the instrument. 
Consequently, this posed challenges in planning and commissioning. Respondent 12 
can’t confirm the criticality of Manufacturing (no. 28). From the respondent’s perspec-
tive, nothing was below expectations there. Basic Design (both no. 20 and 26) was time-
consuming. The results show that it is critical in the electrical category. It was partly un-
clear what the client expected. The client had a consultant who interfered with the plans. 
It was a long process and a little frustrating, which also applies to Detailed Design. Re-
spondent 9 confirms that cooperation is more complicated when consultants represent 
the client, as was the case in Project 1 and 3. 
 
Respondent 12 confirms that the challenges concerning Resource Management were in 
the Site Management Process, as the results show (no. 30). No commissioning manager 
was overseeing the process. There is no room in the budget for that. It was not always 
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the same person commissioning, as the same person can’t stay at the site for weeks. This 
circumstance led to information gaps. The client would have expected longer working 
weeks, but traveling took a lot of time, and the weeks were therefore shorter. In the 
Engineering Process, the team stayed together, and there were no problems relating to 
Resource Management. According to the results, Know-How/Experience, Knowledge, 
and Competence were all critical. Respondent 12 states that the team was not inexperi-
enced; all had several years of experience. It was a young team, which got support from 
the rest of the organization. However, there was no experience concerning the condition 
monitoring tool, which could have led to the criticality of these attributes. Respondent 
16 explains the criticality of these attributes as a possible consequence of the new mar-
ket and new client. The team was experienced during the whole project, but the market 
and the end-customer were new. The respondent confirms that some tools haven’t been 
used before. According to the respondent, there only has to be one or two of these that 
the attribute gets critical. It can be that there were problems with a single tool, which 
affected the assessment of Know-How, although the attribute was not so critical. 
 
Respondent 12 sees the root cause for the cost overrun in the challenging planning pro-
cess, the unclear requirements of the customer and the consultant, and the different 
consequential understandings. Moreover, the budget calculated for materials and work-
ing hours in the sales process was not enough. 
 
 
4.2.5 Comparison between the projects 
Sense and Respond Analysis 
 
In all three projects, most experiences were well below the expectations, which shows 
that there is room for improvement in all performance attributes. It also shows that most 




There was only one performance attribute, which was critical in all three projects. It was 
Resource Management (no. 30) in the Site Management Process. However, many per-
formance attributes were critical in two of the projects or were only narrowly in the 
balanced zone and therefore took the green color. Still, every project had different chal-
lenges, and there were only a few common problems. However, having the right person-
nel resources at the right time caused difficulties in all three projects. Also, a significant 
problem in Project 1 and Project 3 was the cooperation with the consultant of the client, 
which was difficult. In both projects, Schedule Management (no. 9) and Decision-making 




Table 16. Average of expectations of all respondents in all three projects. 
 
 
Table 16 shows the combined average of expectations of all respondents in all three pro-
jects. It represents their opinion on how well the performance attributes must perform 
in future projects so that the projects stay on budget and no cost overrun occurs. The 
results show that the respondents expect all performance attributes to perform well, as 
Rank No. Attribute name Process Category Avg. expectation
1 24 Resource Management Engineering and Validation Process Electrical 8,364
2 23 Off-site Validation Engineering and Validation Process Automation 8,333
3 1 Project scheduling Supporting Processes Startup 8,222
3 18 Resource Management Engineering and Validation Process Automation 8,222
3 21 Detailed Design Engineering and Validation Process Automation 8,222
3 26 Basic Design Engineering and Validation Process Electrical 8,222
7 20 Basic Design Engineering and Validation Process Automation 8,111
8 3 Resource Management Supporting Processes Execution 8,000
8 29 Off-site Validation Engineering and Validation Process Electrical 8,000
10 30 Resource Management Site Management Process - 7,917
10 42 Competence Soft factors - 7,917
12 4 Financial & Cost Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,889
12 6 Procurement & Contractor Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,889
12 8 Risk & Opportunity Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,889
15 45 Teamwork Soft factors - 7,833
16 27 Detailed Design Engineering and Validation Process Electrical 7,818
17 16 Technology Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,800
18 40 Know-How / Experience Soft factors - 7,750
19 15 Knowledge Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,700
20 37 Commissioning Site Management Process Electrical 7,667
21 35 Commissioning Site Management Process Automation 7,636
22 9 Schedule Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,600
22 13 Decision-making Supporting Processes Execution 7,600
22 32 Construction and Installation Site Management Process General 7,600
25 12 Requirement Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,500
25 19 Conceptual Design Engineering and Validation Process Automation 7,500
25 25 Conceptual Design Engineering and Validation Process Electrical 7,500
28 33 Commissioning Site Management Process General 7,455
29 2 Establishing of project team Supporting Processes Startup 7,444
30 43 Engagement Soft factors - 7,417
31 14 Information Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,400
31 34 Construction and Installation Site Management Process Automation 7,400
33 36 Construction and Installation Site Management Process Electrical 7,364
34 11 Quality Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,300
35 5 Communications Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,222
36 46 Organizational culture Soft factors - 7,182
37 39 Professional relationship Soft factors - 7,167
37 41 Knowledge Soft factors - 7,167
39 28 Manufacturing Engineering and Validation Process Electrical 7,111
40 7 Change Management Supporting Processes Execution 7,100
41 22 Manufacturing Engineering and Validation Process Automation 7,000
41 44 Innovation Soft factors - 7,000
43 31 Site Establishment and Mobilization Site Management Process - 6,909
44 17 Project acceptance, take-over and closeout Supporting Processes Closeout 6,889
45 38 Demobilization Site Management Process - 6,600
46 10 HSE Management Supporting Processes Execution 6,444
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all average expectations are over 5. Resource Management (rank no. 1, 3, 8, 10) is ex-
pected to perform very well, with an average expectation of at least 7,917. The respond-
ents also have very high expectations (over 8) towards Off-site Validation (attribute no. 
12, no. 29), Project scheduling (no. 1), Detailed Design (no. 21), and Basic Design (no. 26, 
no. 20). 
 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage analyses 
 
The resource allocation in all projects supports the operations strategy of the company 
well, which can be seen in the medium-high to high SCA values. Project 1 and Project 2 
tend to be Analyzer strategy types, whereas the strategy type of Project 3 is less exact 
with a slight tendency towards Prospector. 
 
Knowledge and Technology Analysis 
 
Basic technology is the dominant technology in all projects and for all performance at-
tributes, except for attribute 35 (Commissioning Automation) in Project 2.  
 
The highest uncertainty is related to core technology in all three projects, followed by 
spearhead technology.  
 
The highest risk is related to core technology in Project 1 and 2, followed by spearhead 
technology, whereas it was the other way around in Project 3. The lowest risk was related 
to basic technology in all projects, which is positive, as the shares of basic technology 
dominate. 
 
Market-based validation and additional data collection 
 
Respondent 9 agrees with the ranking in Table 16, as the respondent sees the same at-
tributes as the most important to mitigate cost overrun. 
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Respondent 16 would put the technologies of the case company in the maturity phase 
of the technology life cycle, as the results show. The respondent states that clients want 
known technologies. The case company uses these technologies for a long time. There-
fore they are well-known solutions. The clients are interested in new technologies, but 
they are not necessarily ready to pay for them. The cost for which the projects can be 
implemented is in a significant role in competitiveness. If a client is prepared to pay the 
case company more than a competitor, that is because they know what the case com-
pany delivers and not because of new or unique technologies. The case company should 
do its job as well as possible and as cost-efficiently as possible. From a technological view, 
it is challenging to differentiate from competitors. For the respondent, the underlying 
theories in this thesis show the reality surprisingly well. 
 
Respondent 16 thinks it sounds reasonable to concentrate on core technologies or at 
least make more apparent what the core of the case company is. Maybe a concentration 
on core technologies could contribute to minimizing the impact of changing personnel 
resources. However, the respondent finds it hard to comment this further, as the under-





This chapter presents and discusses the findings. They are derived from the analysis in 
Chapter 4 and connected to the literature review in Chapter 2. Moreover, the contribu-
tions of this study are presented, and the validity and reliability are addressed. Finally, 




The projects were analyzed in detail in Chapter 4. In Chapter 1.2, the following research 
question was formulated: 
 
“What are the root causes of cost overrun in projects, and how can this be improved?” 
 
The research question will be answered with the help of the two objectives, which were 
defined in Chapter 1.2 as well. 
 
Objective 1: To identify the root causes for cost overrun in the selected projects 
 
In Project 1, according to the respondents, the cost overrun mainly occurred because of 
too few or wrong personnel resources (Resource Management). Another leading cause 
was the challenging consultant of the client, who was very demanding. The critical per-
formance attributes could mainly be traced back to these two influencing factors.  
 
In Project 2, it was insufficient Resource Management, which was the root cause of cost 
overrun. The inadequate resources led to the criticality of most critical performance at-
tributes, which all contributed to the ultimate cost overrun. 
 
In Project 3, the situation looks somewhat different. The core team remained unchanged 
during the whole project; some challenges concerning Resource Management occurred 
105 
 
only in the Site Management Process. The root cause was less exact but was connected 
to the fact that the whole project was bureaucratic, and therefore, much more working 
hours than expected had to be invested. There were unclear requirements from the cli-
ent and his consultant, which led to different understandings. Static uncertainty contrib-
uted to the cost overrun as well, as there were some sudden political restrictions. This 
finding corresponds with Segelod (2018), who states that static uncertainty makes pro-
jects prone to cost overrun (p. 74), as described in Chapter 2.2.1. 
 
These causes all belong to the category of technical explanations for cost overrun and 
were thematized in Chapter 2.2.1. 
 
Objective 2: To identify areas for improvement to help mitigate cost overrun in the 
future 
 
After having located the root causes of cost overrun in the selected projects, some pos-
sible areas for improvement are located. These are all derived from the results of the 
empirical research and the additional interviews conducted. The results are connected 
to the theory. 
 
The areas for improvement are: 
 
• Special focus on the performance attributes with the highest impact on cost 
overrun. Table 15 presented the average expectations of the respondents on how 
well the attributes must perform in future projects so that the project stays on 
budget. The table shows which performance attributes special focus should be 
laid on. Performance attributes with high average expectation should be im-
proved by allocating more resources, as these are the ones that have the highest 
impact on cost overrun, according to the respondents. All attributes with an av-
erage expectation of at least 8 were critical in at least one of the projects. This 
fact underlines that there is a need to develop the attributes with the highest 
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expectations. In the top ten are Resource Management (attribute no. 18, 24, 3, 
30), Off-site Validation (no. 12, no. 29), Project scheduling (no. 1), Detailed Design 
(no. 21), and Basic Design (no. 20, no. 26). These are the essential attributes that 
should be promoted in future projects, as they have the highest impact on cost 
overrun. 
 
• Improvement of Resource Management. Noticeable is that all performance at-
tributes related to Resource Management were critical in Project 1, and all but 
attribute no. 3 in Project 2. In Project 3, Resource Management was critical in the 
Site Management Process. In the interviews, Resource Management was identi-
fied as a root cause for cost overrun in Project 1 and Project 2. This result allows 
the conclusion that cost overrun could be mitigated the best in the future by im-
proving Resource Management, which corresponds with Flyvbjerg et al. (2018), 
who suggests hiring a competent team for the implementation of the project (p. 
185) (Chapter 2.3.1). This conclusion is underlined by the fact that all perfor-
mance attributes connected to Resource Management appear on top in Table 15. 
The most experienced employees should be allocated to the performance attrib-
utes with the highest impact on cost overrun. In this way, cost overrun can be 
mitigated when personnel resources are short. The attributes with the highest 
impact on cost overrun are Basic Design, Detailed Design, and Off-site Validation. 
Three other possible ways to improve Resource Management came up during the 
interviews. One way would be to establish core teams, which stay together dur-
ing the whole project. The project manager would know the team better and 
have clear ideas about what to expect from the team members. Core teams 
would therefore simplify the allocation of work and reduce the risk that the pro-
ject gets out of hand. However, this might not be possible when there are many 
ongoing projects, and personnel resources are short. Another way to improve 
Resource Management could be the nomination of lead engineers, one for auto-
mation and one for electrical work, who accompany the whole project and don’t 
change during the project. They would be responsible for pulling strings from a 
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technical perspective, while the project manager can focus on operational tasks. 
Compared to core teams, this has the advantage that fewer people are fixated to 
one project, which leaves more wiggle room to allocate personnel resources 
where needed most. A third way could be to concentrate on the mitigation of the 
consequences when Resource Management is critical, and the optimal personnel 
resources are not available. This conclusion leads to the next area for improve-
ment. 
 
• Uniform working directives. Often, there are personnel resources from other 
units deployed. According to Segelod (2018), this makes the project prone to cost 
overrun, as these actors have no experience of similar projects (pp. 72, 74-75) 
(see Chapter 2.2.1). Some of the problems occurred because they were used to 
a different organizational culture or other ways of working. Own personnel re-
sources might have different ways of working, too. A dossier with working direc-
tives would ensure that everybody involved in the projects is on the same page 
and knows how to act. This approach would also reduce the impact of changing 
personnel resources. It must then be ensured that all employees involved in the 
projects have read and understood the directives. Information gathered from 
personal communication suggests that the existing quality documentation and 
guidelines are not necessarily read and followed by all employees. 
 
• Special attention to new clients and clients with consultants. Another factor 
with a high impact on cost overrun in Project 1 and Project 3 was the consultant 
of the client. Also, the client was new in Project 3. The cooperation was bureau-
cratic and time-consuming in both projects. There were different understandings 
of the requirements. Consequently, there should be a consensus about the re-
quirements already in an early stage of the project, which would prevent endless 
discussions and delays because of disagreements. In the best case, there is a con-
sensus already at the end of the sales process. Special attention should therefore 
be given to projects implemented for new clients, or where consultants are 
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involved. Furthermore, there might be possibilities for new innovative ways of 
cooperation. 
 
• Reduction of costs. In the technology life cycle, a clear dominance of basic tech-
nology and low amounts of core- and spearhead technology is a sign that the 
products and services offered have reached the maturity phase. The theory pre-
sented in the literature review suggests that to sustain its position in the market, 
the case company should focus on reducing production costs, on newly invented 
products, and innovative technology, as explained in Chapter 3.6.1. Cost 
reductions are essential for competitive advantage, as customers are not 
necessarily ready to pay a premium for better technical performance. That was 
confirmed by Respondent 16, who stated that customers demand known solu-
tions from the case company. High shares of basic technology furthermore mean 
that the case company can’t differentiate from competitors from a technological 
perspective. Newly invented products might eventually get of concern, as tech-
nologies in the maturity phase are one day replaced by new technologies. 
 
• Investing in core technology. The highest uncertainty in all three projects is re-
lated to core technology. It is the technology that should most be invested in to 
gain and sustain competitive advantage and to succeed in projects. However, 
spearhead technology should not be neglected. These investments will ulti-
mately contribute to the mitigation of cost overruns. Investing in core technolo-
gies starts with the awareness of all parties involved, which technologies of the 
case company bring competitive advantage and allow to differentiate from com-
petitors. As customers require known solutions, the investment in core technol-
ogy should concentrate on the Supporting Processes. That would mean that the 
competitive advantage compared to competitors is not achieved by more inno-
vative solutions for the customer, but by raising the efficiency and competitive-
ness of the Supporting Processes, which will contribute to the reduction of costs. 
This procedure ensures that competitive prices can be offered. The new core of 
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the case company could comprise solutions to improve Resource Management, 
solutions for uniform working directives, and improved ways of cooperation with 
the clients, which are all areas for improvement presented before. Core technol-
ogy can also refer to a very well-designed process that brings competitive ad-
vantage, not only to software or components. 
 
The most critical areas for improvement were presented above. However, the results 
show that there is room for improvement in all performance attributes, which is typical 
for an ambitious company. It is hard to tell which attribute was responsible for which 
amount of cost overrun, as it is difficult to directly compare the cost calculation to the 
cost reporting and the performance attributes. Moreover, this thesis concentrates on 
the objective opinions of the respondents. Siemiatycki (2015) suggests the enhancement 
of performance monitoring, reporting, and information sharing to mitigate cost overrun 
(pp. 5-6), as explained in Chapter 2.3.1. For the case company, an alignment of the cost 
reporting to the cost calculation would simplify their analysis and concluding, as compa-
rable data would be readily available. 
 
Every project encounters individual problems, as, amongst others, the country, language, 
culture, requirements, and scope can vary a lot. Therefore, the reasons for cost overrun 
are diverse. This circumstance is verified by the results, which show different critical per-
formance attributes for different projects. Resource Management, however, is an attrib-
ute that affects every project, as the resources for every project principally come from 
the same pool of staff. Improvements in Resource Management thus positively affect the 
mitigation of cost overrun in all projects. However, it doesn’t guarantee that cost over-
runs won’t occur in the future, as causes are manifold. Some reasons for cost overrun 
are related to static uncertainty, which can’t be entirely prevented by better planning 
and better operations.  
 
One must take note that performance attributes influence each other. Some might only 
be critical because of the criticality of another. As an example, poor Resource 
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Management in the Site Management Process certainly reduces the performance of all 
other attributes of the Site Management Process. Therefore, additional information 
through interviews was needed to locate the root cause for cost overrun. 
 
Surprisingly, the performance attribute “Professional relationship” (no. 39) was not crit-
ical in Project 1 and Project 3. However, respondents reported difficulties in the cooper-
ation with the client and even saw it as a root cause for cost overrun. The experiences 
were clearly under the expectations for this attribute in both projects, but the attributes 
were not critical. A possible explanation could be that all respondents did not read the 
additional description for the performance attribute. It clearly states that by this attrib-
ute, the relationship with the customer is meant. It would have been better to name the 
attribute, for instance, “Cooperation with the customer”, to avoid misunderstandings. 
However, the difficulties in cooperation with the customers could be seen in both pro-
jects in the criticality of Schedule Management (no. 9) and Decision-making (no. 13). 
 
The influence of the sales process on cost overrun in the Engineering Process and Site 
Management Process could not be examined in this study because most engineers were 
not involved in the sales process. Consequently, the sales process couldn’t be included 
in the questionnaire. Therefore, it remains open how significant the influence of opti-
mism bias and planning fallacy is. Still, it could be considered to organize schoolings on 
the topic for employees involved in the sales process to raise awareness for optimism 
bias and planning fallacy, as this probably is an influencing factor. Furthermore, the in-
fluence of the cost estimation technique used to estimate the costs of the Engineering 
Process and Site Management Process remains to be examined as well. 
 
In the AHP analysis, the answers varied a lot, except for the RAL component Flexibility.  
This result raises the question if the operations strategy of the case company is defined 
clearly enough. All employees involved in the projects should know what the operations 
strategy of the case company is and, therefore, how the priorities in the project should 
be laid. According to the results, the strategy type of the case company is Analyzer. It is 
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positive that the resource allocation in all projects corresponds well with the operations 
strategy, as can be seen in the SCA analysis and, therefore, didn’t contribute to the cost 




This thesis contributed to the theory by presenting a study that includes a comprehen-
sive literature review on the contractor’s perspective on cost overrun in projects. This 
view contrasts with the project owner’s perspective. Although there are many similari-
ties, there are also some significant differences between these perspectives. 
 
This thesis furthermore located critical performance attributes and, therefore, important 
operations, which contribute to cost overrun in projects. Finally, some root causes were 
identified.  
 
The thesis not only considered the operational perspective but also the importance of 
Technology- and Knowledge Management was described. The technology type which 
causes the most uncertainty was located and possible risks caused by technology were 
presented. 
 
Improvement proposals were made, which contribute to the mitigation of cost overrun. 
The WMT provided evidence that the methods used were suited for the detection of 
root causes for cost overrun. 
 
 
5.3 Validity and Reliability 
Validity was increased by incorporating the advice of several experts in the creation of 
the questionnaire, which led to a comprehensive list of performance attributes for the 
Engineering Process and the Site Management Process. The experts confirmed that the 
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questionnaire covered all important operations relating to the Engineering Process and 
the Site Management Process. The acid test increased validity, as the respondent agreed 
with the results, and further suggestions led to improvements in the questionnaire. 
When it comes to the AHP questionnaire, validity was guaranteed by ensuring that the 
ICR was always less than 0.3. 
 
Reliability was ensured by adding clear instructions and examples to the questionnaires. 
Assistance in filling out the questionnaires was offered, if needed. Furthermore, the per-
formance attributes in the S&R questionnaire cover the problem from many angles, 
which improves reliability. Objectivity was guaranteed by independent answers from the 
respondents in both the AHP- and the S&R questionnaire. Although the number of re-
sponses was limited, the experience of the respondents should sufficiently reflect the 
actual incidents in the projects. Furthermore, employees with different tasks and per-
spectives on the projects were included to get a comprehensive picture of the projects. 
 
In the K/T analysis, all variability coefficients were clearly under 1, which shows a rela-
tively broad consensus between the respondents. 
 
Both validity and reliability were improved by carrying out a WMT. It was accepted for 
most of the results by the interviewed respondents.  
 
However, there were also some challenges encountered during the studies, which might 
have compromised the results. The respondents’ opinions on the projects partly varied 
a lot, depending on their perception, viewpoints, and role in the project. Therefore, the 
validation through the WMT could have brought different results, depending on with 
whom the WMT was carried out. The different perspectives on the project could also 
generally be seen in the assessment of the performance attributes. As an example, there 
were cases where some respondents only worked in the Engineering Process, and other 
respondents only worked in the Site Management Process. Therefore, they had different 
opinions about the performance of some attributes of the Supporting Processes and soft 
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factors, as many influencing factors might have changed between the processes. Many 
respondents carried out isolated tasks in the project, which means they might miss the 
overall picture. Also, a project manager might have a different view on certain perfor-
mance attributes than an engineer. Nevertheless, all opinions combined should give a 
representative result. 
 
The number of projects in which cost overrun occurred was limited to three. Although 
these three projects can be considered representative, a bigger sample of projects would 
increase the reliability of the results. It would have furthermore been interesting to add 
a project where no cost overrun occurred, to see how the results distinguish. 
 
In the K/T part of the questionnaire, the division into basic-, core-, and spearhead tech-
nology was considered to be rather difficult by the respondents. Even more examples 
and background information on the method might have helped the respondents answer-
ing the questionnaire. Also, some performance attributes directly influence the success 
of the Engineering- and Site Management Process, but the respondents themselves are 
not responsible for these particular performance attributes. This condition means they 
can assess the performance of the attribute, but they don’t necessarily know all under-
lying technologies. An example is performance attribute no. 6, Procurement & Contrac-
tor Management. It influences the work of the respondents and the success of the pro-
ject. But as there is a separate purchasing team, the respondents don’t necessarily know 
all technologies involved. Therefore, the share of technology must be interpreted from 
the perspective of the respondents and doesn’t necessarily reflect the actual reality. 
 
Not every respondent could assess all performance attributes because some respond-
ents carried out isolated tasks in the project. Thus, there are some performance attrib-
utes with only two answers in the S&R part or K/T part of the questionnaire. The relia-
bility of the results for performance attributes with less than three answers is somewhat 
compromised. Especially in the K/T analysis, the reliability of the CV of K/T, the VarC, and 




For some respondents, the examined project was the first in this particular segment of 
the case company. Therefore, they couldn’t assess past projects in the “Direction of De-
velopment” section. Consequently, they left this section empty, and the Development 
Index was only calculated with the help of the answers from the other respondents, 
which could assess this section. In Project 2 and Project 3, the Development Index is 
therefore built from fewer answers, which slightly compromises the reliability. 
 
Furthermore, the influence of the sales process could not holistically be studied by the 
methods used in this thesis. Which share of the cost overrun in the Engineering Process 
and Site Management Process was due to actions in the Sales Process, remains, there-
fore, open. However, the price is primarily determined by the market, which significantly 
reduces the impact of the sales process on cost overruns of the case company. 
 
 
5.4 Future research 
There are various possibilities for future research in this field. 
 
The research could be extended to more projects, in which cost overrun occurred. An 
extension would provide further insight into the topic, and more root causes might be 
found. This thesis focused on the Engineering- and Site Management Process, in which 
usually the most significant share of cost overrun occurs. Future research could concen-
trate on other processes of the projects. Especially interesting would be a more in-depth 
look into the impact of the sales process on cost overrun. It would be interesting because 
the cost estimation, which forms the baseline for the measurement of cost overrun, is 
created in the sales process. Consequently, the process plays a crucial role in cost over-
run. Future research could examine the possibility of including RCF and, therefore, an 
outside view of cost estimation as a possible new way to determine the project contin-




The research could also be extended to other segments of the case company, which 
might require some adaptions in the S&R questionnaire. Moreover, a similar study could 
also be conducted on the organizational level to improve the operations in general. 
 
A further possibility for research would be to examine and improve Resource Manage-
ment, which was located to be the primary root cause of cost overrun. The objective 




This research aimed to locate the root causes for cost overrun from a contractor’s per-
spective and to present improvement proposals for its mitigation. A wide range of meth-
ods was used for this purpose to gain a comprehensive picture of the situation in the 
case company. The methods comprised the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP), the Crit-
ical Factor Indexes (CFI), the Sense and Respond method (S&R), the RAL-concept, the 
Manufacturing Strategy Index (MSI), the Knowledge and Technology method (K/T), and 
the Sustainable Competitive Advantage model (SCA). 
 
Based on the analysis, it can be concluded that there were mainly two root causes of 
cost overrun in the examined projects. The first and most serious root cause is Resource 
Management. There were challenges to have the right personnel resources in the pro-
jects at the right time, which led to manifold problems during the Engineering Process 
and Site Management Process. The second root cause found was the cooperation with 
the client and the client’s consultant, which was difficult and time-consuming in Project 
1 and Project 3. The research furthermore presented improvement proposals for the 
mitigation of cost overrun in future projects. The recommendations are all connected to 
the root causes for cost overrun, some of them strongly, others more loosely. Particular 
focus on performance attributes with a high impact on cost overrun, improvement of 
Resource Management, uniform working directives, and special attention to new clients 
and clients with consultants are suggested for the mitigation of cost overrun based on 
the S&R analysis. The K/T results suggest cost reductions and investments in core tech-
nologies. 
 
A comprehensive literature review on cost overruns in projects from the perspective of 
a contractor was presented. There are technical- and behavioral explanations for cost 
overrun. However, the technical explanations are considered more important for a con-
tractor in a competitive market. The results are based on the subjective opinions of the 
employees involved in the projects of the case company. The data was collected with the 
help of questionnaires. Receiving the answers from the respondents took some time, 
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not least because of the prevailing COVID-19 situation. The respondents all had different 
perspectives and tasks in the project, and their opinions differed. Nevertheless, the 
methods used could point out which operations were critical in the projects and there-
fore contributed most to the cost overruns. The methods examined the projects from an 
operative and a technological perspective. The results and the proposed areas for im-
provement allow addressing the problem of recurring cost overruns specifically. 
 
Generally, project costs tend to overrun, and progress in the field has been slow, as nu-
merous examples show. It is a topic that will continue to be of concern in the future, as 
cost overruns in projects can’t entirely be ruled out. However, the problem can be miti-
gated when the root causes are known. The presented improvement proposals allow the 
case company to maintain a sustainable competitive advantage and to reduce the risk of 
cost overruns. The recommendations will eventually contribute to the realization of suc-
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Appendix 1. AHP questionnaire 
 
 
Dear project team member,
Master Thesis, Root causes and improvement proposals for cost overrun in projects
Tobias Lutz, University of Vaasa 
Thank you for filling out the AHP questionnaire.
Instructions and Explanations
In the AHP questionnaire, you have to weight the components "Quality", "Cost", "Time" and 
"Flexibility" according to their importance in the projects. More detailed instructions can be 
found in the questionnaire.
The collected information is confidential. It will be used as statistical data in my thesis, but 
individual responses are not separately identifiable.
Please feel free to ask if there are questions or uncertainties.





   
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process n= 4 Input 1
Objective: Weighting of the components Quality, Cost, Time and Flexibility
Only input data in the light green fields!













1 a: 0,3 CR: 0 % 1
Name Weight Date Consistency Ratio
Criteria more important ? Scale A
i j  - A or B (1-9) B
12 1 2 Quality 1,00 0,00
13 1 3 1,00 0,00
14 1 4 1,00 0,00
0 1 5 1,00 0,00
0 1 6 1,00 0,00
0 1 7 1,00 0,00
0 1 8 1,00 0,00
23 2 3 Cost 1,00 0,00
24 2 4 1,00 0,00
0 2 5 1,00 0,00
0 2 6 1,00 0,00
0 2 7 1,00 0,00
0 2 8 1,00 0,00
34 3 4 Time 1,00 0,00
0 3 5 1,00 0,00
0 3 6 1,00 0,00
0 3 7 1,00 0,00
0 3 8 1,00 0,00
0 4 5 1,00 0,00
0 4 6 1,00 0,00
0 4 7 1,00 0,00
0 4 8 1,00 0,00
0 5 6 1,00 0,00
0 5 7 1,00 0,00
0 5 8 1,00 0,00
0 6 7 1,00 0,00
0 6 8 1,00 0,00
0 7 8 1,00 0,00
0 0
9 Extreme importance
The evidence favoring one element over another i s  of the 
highest poss ible order of affi rmation
2,4,6,8 can be used to express intermediate values
Please weight the components "Quality", "Cost", "Time" and "Flexibility" according to their 
importance in the projects. Consistency of the answers is important. For example, it is not 
possible that "Cost" is more important than "Time", when at the same time "Quality" is more 
important than "Cost" but less important than "Time".
Due to consistency: If comparisons are highlighted after giving your answers (different shades of 
red, 1, 2 and 3 in column M), please adjust the importance and scale until no comparisons are 
highlighted anymore.
Hint: It's easiest to alter the answer highlighted in dark red
5 Strong Importance








One element i s  favored very s trongly over another, i t 
dominance is  demonstrated in practice
1 Equal importance Two elements  contribute equal ly to the objective
3 Moderate importance































Flexibil ity This is the ability to change the operation during the project in some 
way. The change can be related to what the operation does, how it is 
doing it, or when it is doing it.
Please compare the importance of the elements in relation to the objective and fill in the table: Which element 
of each pair is more important, A or B, and how much more on a scale 1-9 as given below. 
Once completed, you might adjust highlighted comparisons 1 to 3 to improve consistency.
Quality Quality means that things are done right. It includes design quality (set 
of features which a product/service has) as well as process quality 
(quality inside the operations).
Cost These are the operational cost, which should be optimized, such as for 
staff, facilities, technology and equipment and materials.




Appendix 2. Sense & Respond questionnaire 
 
 
Dear project team member,
Example:
Technology share of performance attribute: State the share of basic-, core- and spearhead 
technology in %, which is used for the completion of every performance attribute in this project. 
Please check the examples in the questionnaire sheet before filling out.
More detailed explanations are added as comments into the questionnaire and can be viewed 
by holding the cursor over the respective cell.
You can find the questionnaire on the next Excel sheet (Sense and Respond Questionnaire).
There is a list of 46 Performance Attributes, which cover the operations within the project. 
Please fill out all performance attributes, which you can assess. The focus is on the engineering- 
and the site management process of the project.
Each Performance Attribute must be evaluated from following perspectives:
Expectation: How well does the attribute has to perform in coming projects (next 3 years) to 
deliver a successful project? Scale: From 1 (low expectations) to 10 (high expectations)
Please feel free to ask if there are questions or uncertainties. We also can fill out the 
questionnaire together.
Thank you for your help.
Best regards,
Tobias Lutz
The collected information is confidential. It will be used as statistical data in my thesis, but 
individual responses are not separately identifiable.
Master Thesis, Root causes and improvement proposals for cost overrun in projects
Tobias Lutz, University of Vaasa
Thank you for filling out the questionnaire.
Instructions and Explanations
Experience: Assess the outcome (success) of the attribute in this project on a scale from 1 (worst) 
to 10 (best)
Direction of Development: How was the performance of the attribute compared to previous 





worse same better Basic Core Spearhead
Sum 
(has to be 100 %!)
1 Project scheduling 8 5 x 60 % 30 % 10 % 100 %
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES










worse same better Basic % Core % Spearhead %
Sum 
(has to be 100 %!)
Supporting Processes
1 Project scheduling 0 %
2 Establishing of project team 0 %
3 Resource Management 0 %
4 Financial & Cost Management 0 %
5 Communications Management 0 %
6 Procurement & Contractor Management 0 %
7 Change Management 0 %
8 Risk & Opportunity Management 0 %
9 Schedule Management 0 %
10 HSE Management 0 %
11 Quality Management 0 %
12 Requirement Management 0 %
13 Decision-making 0 %
14 Information Management 0 %
15 Knowledge Management 0 %
16 Technology Management 0 %
Closeout 17 Project acceptance, take-over and closeout 0 %
Engineering  and Validation Process
18 Resource Management 0 %
19 Conceptual Design 0 %
20 Basic Design 0 %
21 Detailed Design 0 %
22 Manufacturing 0 %
23 Off-site Validation 0 %
24 Resource Management 0 %
25 Conceptual Design 0 %
26 Basic Design 0 %
27 Detailed Design 0 %
28 Manufacturing 0 %
29 Off-site Validation 0 %
Site Management Process
30 Resource Management 0 %
31 Site Establishment and Mobilization 0 %
32 Construction and Installation 0 %
33 Commissioning 0 %
34 Construction and Installation 0 %
35 Commissioning 0 %
36 Construction and Installation 0 %
37 Commissioning 0 %
38 Demobilization 0 %
Soft factors
39 Professional relationship 0 %
40 Know-How / Experience 0 %
41 Knowledge 0 %
42 Competence 0 %
43 Engagement 0 %
44 Innovation 0 %
45 Teamwork 0 %
46 Organizational culture 0 %
Technology share of performance attribute 
Please answer all attributes and sections you can 
assess, as accurately as possible (green cells)
This questionnaire assesses the performance of the project's operations from the point of view of the project team.
Please fill out the whole row (Expectation, Experience, Direction of Development and Technology share of performance attribute) for every performance attribute you can assess, as accurately as 
possible, for the project in question, from your point of view. 
Please check the more detailed explanations, which can be found by holding the cursor over the respective cell
PERFORMANCE ATTRIBUTES
Direction of 
Development
Startup
Execution
Name of Respondent:
General
Automation
Electrical
Automation
Electrical
